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I. INTRODUCTION
The shores of the Great Lakes may look serene, but they are a battleground.
Members of the public enjoy using the shores for fishing, boating, birding, or simply
strolling along and taking in the scenic vistas. Repeatedly, however, owners of land
bordering the Great Lakes (i.e., littoral owners),1 armed with deeds indicating they
own the shore to the water’s edge or even lower, have tried to stop members of the
public from using their property above the water’s edge. The right to exclude others
from your property, the littoral owners argue, is one of the most important sticks in
the bundle of property ownership rights and should be enforceable on the Great
Lakes shores just as anywhere else. Members of the public, on the other hand, claim
that such shores are common to all and cannot be the exclusive domain of a private
landowner. Raising the “public trust doctrine” as a shield (or sword), these members
of the public contend that the shores of the Great Lakes are held in trust by the state
for use by the public, and therefore they have the right to walk along the shore above
the water’s edge.
Courts have been inconsistent, in approach and result, when determining the
rights of the public to use the Great Lakes shores. The Michigan Supreme Court, in
a controversial 2005 decision, largely sided with the walking public. In a 5-2
decision, the state high court reversed an intermediate appeals court and held that,
pursuant to the public trust doctrine, the public has a right to walk along the
Michigan shores of the Great Lakes up to the ordinary high water mark, even though
the shore is privately owned.2 Ohio to date, however, has largely sided with the
littoral owners. An Ohio court of appeals in August 2009 ruled that the public trust
stops at the water’s edge and that members of the public have no right to use
privately owned Lake Erie shore above the water’s edge.3 In other Great Lakes
states, the applicability of the public trust doctrine to the Great Lakes shores, and the
public’s right to use those shores, remain subjects of controversy and uncertainty.4
In general, the public trust doctrine provides that, primarily in recognition of the
importance of navigable waters to society, a state holds the navigable waters within
its borders, and the lands underlying them, in trust for the benefit of the public to use
for certain purposes.5 Despite its deep roots and wide acceptance, however, the
public trust doctrine remains controversial and somewhat amorphous. While some
1

Land that borders a lake is known as “littoral property,” and the owners of such property
have certain littoral rights. See infra Part II. These rights are roughly equivalent to riparian
rights enjoyed by riparian owners of land that borders flowing waters such as rivers and
streams. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1083 (4th ed. 2006).
2

Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 78 (Mich. 2005).

3

Merrill v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., Nos. 2008-L-007 & 2008-L-008, 2009 WL
2591758 (Ohio Ct. App., Aug. 21, 2009), notices of appeal filed, No. 2009-1806 (Ohio Oct. 7,
2009).
4

See infra Part III. There are eight Great Lakes states: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
5
See, e.g., DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 17-18
(2d ed. 1997); Stephen E. Roady, The Public Trust Doctrine, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW
AND POLICY 39, 41 (Donald C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton eds., 2008).
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champion the public trust doctrine as a vital guarantee of the public’s rights to use
important natural resources,6 others urge that the doctrine is an ill-defined excuse for
activist judges to override the actions of legislatures and to take private property
rights without just compensation.7 Of particular relevance here is the considerable
disagreement regarding the proper scope and effect of the public trust doctrine.8
This Article does not try to resolve every nuance of the public trust doctrine.
Rather, it tries to sort through the cacophony of cases and commentary to identify
core principles of the public trust doctrine relevant to the Great Lakes shores and to
offer guidance regarding the public’s right to use the shores of the Great Lakes, in
relation to the rights and duties of littoral owners and the states. While
acknowledging that ultimately the public trust doctrine may vary from state to state,
this Article proposes a uniform legal framework for use by each Great Lakes state
for ascertaining the proper scope and effect of the public trust doctrine relating to the
shores of the Great Lakes. Although the Article uses the public’s right to walk the
shores as a focal point for analysis, the proper scope and effect of the public trust
doctrine along the Great Lakes shores has importance far beyond beachwalking. At
stake are thousands of miles of shore properties and their future uses (e.g.,
development of an economically valuable parcel, preservation of an ecologically rich
beach).9
Part II of this Article sets the stage by discussing the public trust doctrine and
other legal principles relevant to the Great Lakes shores. Part III explores how the
Michigan and Ohio courts have grappled with whether, and to what extent, the public
has a right to walk along the Great Lakes shores by virtue of the public trust doctrine,
yielding widely divergent results. In Part IV, the Article proposes a uniform legal
framework, grounded in the core principles of the public trust doctrine, for use in all
Great Lakes jurisdictions to ascertain the public’s rights to use the Great Lakes
shores pursuant to the public trust doctrine. Specifically, the proposed framework
provides a principled approach for determining the geographic scope of the public
trust doctrine and the uses protected by the doctrine. Regarding the geographic
scope, this Article invokes the equal footing doctrine to argue that each state should
begin its analysis from a common starting point. Further, notwithstanding Supreme
Court language saying each state can define the limits of the lands it holds in trust,
the power of the states to do so should be limited by the public trust doctrine itself.
Regarding uses protected by the public trust doctrine, this Article proposes criteria
that allow a state to recognize protected uses beyond the traditional, but only where
the uses are important to society and do not unreasonably intrude upon the rights of
6
See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klaas, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (2006); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471
(1970).
7

See, e.g., James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 567 (1989) [hereinafter, Huffman, Out of
Water]; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction
& Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 48, 54-58 (2006).
8

See Roady, supra note 5, at 42.

9

There are more than 10,000 miles of Great Lakes shoreline in the eight Great Lakes
states. SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 2.
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the littoral owners. Part V examines how the proposed framework could be applied
in each of the Great Lakes states, consistent with the existing authorities in those
states, to bring much-needed predictability to the public’s right to use the Great
Lakes shores.
II. BACKGROUND
The public trust doctrine has ancient roots. The Romans’ codification of law, the
Institutes of Justinian, recognized the public nature of rivers, the sea, and its shores:
“By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water,
the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.”10
English common law similarly recognized the importance of maintaining
navigable waters and the lands underlying them for common use. Control over
navigable waters and the lands underlying them was considered an essential element
of sovereignty, and therefore lands underlying navigable waters were owned by the
crown in trust for use by the people. Both private, jus privatum, and public, jus
publicum, interests were recognized in the lands underlying navigable waters. While
legal title to the lands under navigable waters (jus privatum) could be transferred by
the crown to a private party, the crown would continue to hold the public’s interest in
using the lands (jus publicum) in trust for the people. Thus, notwithstanding private
ownership of lands underlying navigable waters, the government retained its trust
obligation, and the public would continue to have the rights to make use of navigable
waters and underlying lands.11
The United States inherited the public trust doctrine from English common law.
A series of nineteenth century U.S. Supreme Court cases made clear that the states
owned the lands underlying navigable waters in trust for their people to use.12 Public

10
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN § 2.1.1, at 90 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 7th ed. 1922).
Some scholars suggest that this statement was more aspirational than descriptive and that
grants of land under navigable waters by the Roman government to private owners were not
unknown. See James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing
and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 9 & n.16 (1997).
11

See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1894) (explaining English common law).
The most influential discussion of the public trust doctrine in English common law was Lord
Chief Justice Matthew Hale’s De Jure Maris. Sir Matthew Hale, De Jure Maris, in A
HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 370-413 (Stuart A. Moore ed.,
3d ed. 1888). While Hale’s treatise arguably may not have accurately reflected the English
common law when it was written in the 17th Century, see Rasband, supra note 10, at 13-15,
there is no question that it reflected the common law of England as of the early 19th Century
and was extremely influential in shaping early American law. Id. For a more detailed
discussion of the history of the public trust doctrine, see Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum,
and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976).
12

See Shively, 152 U.S. 1; Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Pollard v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367
(1842). Although actually navigable waters in England essentially were equivalent to waters
subject to the ebb and flow of tides, in the United States many non-tidal rivers and lakes were
actually navigable. Due to the importance of these non-tidal navigable waters in our new
nation, the Supreme Court recognized that the reach of the public trust doctrine in the United
States extended to non-tidal navigable waters as well. See Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S.
324, 337-38 (1876); see also Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443
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use of navigable waters was deemed too important to be subject to private
interference.13 While a state could transfer title (jus privatum) of lands underlying
navigable waters to a private party, the underlying lands nevertheless remained
subject to the public’s rights to use the waters and underlying land (jus publicum)
held by the state.14
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois15
is often referred to as the “lodestar” of American public trust law.16 In 1869, the
Illinois legislature sold more than one thousand acres of lands underlying Lake
Michigan along the Chicago waterfront in fee to the Illinois Central Railroad for
development purposes. Four years later, the legislature repealed the grant and sought
to have the original grant declared invalid. The Supreme Court invoked the public
trust doctrine to invalidate the original legislative grant. While noting that the public
trust doctrine in England was limited to waters affected by the tides, since non-tidal
rivers and lakes there were not actually navigable, the Court held that the public trust
doctrine in the United States equally applies to the lands underlying the Great
Lakes.17 The Court ruled that the state not only held title to the lands under Lake
Michigan in a proprietary capacity, but also in a sovereign capacity in trust for the
people of the state to use for purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishing. In light
of the trust obligation, the State of Illinois was not permitted to alienate the lands in a
manner that did not preserve the waters for the use of the public. Because the grant
to the railroad effectively would have placed a vast, key swath of Lake Michigan
under private control and prevented the public from using it for navigation, fishing,
and commerce, the Court struck the grant as violating the public trust doctrine.18
The public trust doctrine is now entrenched in American jurisprudence. The
Supreme Court has reaffirmed its vitality,19 and the public trust doctrine has been

(1851) (deviating from English rule to hold that federal court admiralty jurisdiction under the
Constitution is not limited to tidal waters).
13
See Shively, 152 U.S. at 57; Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 436. Part of the impetus for
recognition of the public trust doctrine also was that lands underlying waters cannot be
cultivated or improved like uplands. See Shively, 152 U.S. at 57. Some have argued that the
public trust doctrine has origins in natural law. See George P Smith II & Michael W.
Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307 (2006).
14

See Shively, 152 U.S. at 12-13; Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 458.

15

Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. 387.

16

See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 640 (1986); Sax,
supra note 6, at 489.
17

Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 435-37. The Great Lakes are not appreciably affected by the ebb
and flow of tides. Id. at 435-36.
18
Id. at 452-53. For an in-depth factual and historical discussion of Illinois Central, see
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine:
What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004).
19

See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
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recognized across the nation, including in all of the Great Lakes states.20 Historically
a common law doctrine, the public trust doctrine can differ somewhat from state to
state.21 But at its core, the public trust doctrine teaches that each state holds the
navigable waters and lands underlying them in trust for use by the public for certain
protected uses, traditionally navigation, fishing, and commerce.22 Not only does the
public trust doctrine afford certain rights to the public, it imposes certain
responsibilities on the state to protect the public’s rights to use those waters and
underlying lands.23 The public trust doctrine can be employed to invalidate or stop
both governmental and private actions that violate the doctrine.24
Despite its long history and wide acceptance, the public trust doctrine remains
controversial and less than sharply defined,25 and it has spawned an immense amount
of commentary.26 Some commentators have focused on the source of the judiciary’s
power to overturn the legislature’s grant in Illinois Central. The Supreme Court in a
later opinion stated that the public trust doctrine articulated in Illinois Central was
based on Illinois law.27 But some commentators, perhaps noting the relative paucity
of Illinois law cited in Justice Field’s opinion and recognizing that state common law
may not be a sound foundation for a doctrine that allows the judiciary to override the
acts of a legislature, have differed widely in their efforts to explain the source of the
public trust doctrine as articulated in Illinois Central.28

20

SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 3; Roady, supra note 5, at 41. See infra Part V for
discussion of the public trust doctrine in the eight Great Lakes states.
21
SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 3; Roady, supra note 5, at 41-42. See also Robin Kundis
Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrine: Classifications of States,
Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007) (state-by-state
summary of the public trust doctrine in the Eastern United States).
22

SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 17-18; Roady, supra note 5, at 41.

23

See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452-53; SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 590.

24

SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 590; Lazarus, supra note 16, at 645-46.

25

See, e.g., Roady, supra note 5, at 39 (“The Public Trust Doctrine is controversial, and its
contours are not sharply defined.”); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public
Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425,
426 (1989) (“[T]he public trust doctrine is one of the most controversial developments in
modern American law, and perhaps the single most controversial development in natural
resources law.”).
26

The volume of scholarly literature on the public trust doctrine was described as “vast”
more than a decade ago, Rasband, supra note 10, at 3 n.2, and one commentator counted more
than 1700 articles since 1990 that make reference to the public trust doctrine. James L.
Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truth—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 13 n.59 (2007).
27

Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926).

28
Some have argued that the doctrine is rooted in the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g.,
Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 449-50 (Commerce Clause); Richard A. Epstein, The Public
Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411 (1987) (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses). Others
have suggested that Illinois Central was the product of federal common law, see Rasband,
supra note 10, at 65, which presumably should relegate the doctrine to the legal scrap heap
post-Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (rejecting federal common law as a
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Substantial commentary also has focused on advocating, or criticizing, expansion
of the public trust doctrine beyond its roots in navigable waters and underlying lands.
Professor Joseph Sax in 1970 published an influential law review article that urged a
more robust use of the public trust doctrine to preserve natural resources beyond
navigable waters and submerged lands.29 Subsequently, an expansive public trust
doctrine has been championed by some as an effective tool to rein in the government
and private developers, to protect the environment, and to ensure public access.30
On the other hand, some commentators have criticized the public trust doctrine,
claiming that it is an ill-defined excuse for judges to override the decisions of elected
legislatures and to trample and take private property rights without due compensation
to the owners, either by restricting the owners’ ability to use their property or by
forcing them to allow the public to use their property.31 The U.S. Constitution
prohibits the government from taking private property for public use without just
compensation to the owner.32 The public trust doctrine can be an effective bar to a
taking claim. For example, if the government were to require a private property
owner to open her property for use by the public, the property owner could claim that
her property (e.g., her right to exclusive use of her property) has been taken by the
government for public use and demand compensation. However, if her property
were subject to the public trust doctrine, the public would have a right to use her
property for at least certain protected uses (e.g., fishing). The government could
successfully defend against a taking claim by arguing that she only held the jus
privatum and the government still retained the jus publicum, and therefore allowing
the public to fish on her property did not constitute a taking because there had been
no change in her property rights.33
basis to decide state law claims in federal courts). Still others have argued that, regardless of
its original provenance, the public trust doctrine has been enshrined in many state
constitutions. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust:
Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a
Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 438-51 (1997); Klaas, supra note 6,
at 714-19.
29

Sax, supra note 6. In short, Professor Sax advocated using the doctrine to allow citizens
to gain access to courts, where the judiciary could enforce public trust rights against the
government and private parties to protect natural resources. As Professor Sax observed, “Of
all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust doctrine seems to have the
breadth and substantive content which might make it useful as a tool of general application for
citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management
problems.” Id. at 474.
30
See, e.g., David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial
Protection of the Public’s Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 311, 367-78 (1988); Klaas, supra note 6.
31

See, e.g., Huffman, Out of Water, supra note 7, at 567; see also Thompson, supra note
7, at 54-58 (articulating conservative worries).
32

U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.

33

See James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public
Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines At Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
171 (1987) [hereinafter, Huffman, Takings Clause]; Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Note, Public and
Private Property Rights: Regulatory and Physical Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 32
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421 (2005).
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Some jurisdictions have interpreted the public trust doctrine somewhat more
expansively in recent decades. But even these most expansive and controversial
applications of the public trust doctrine have not strayed too far from navigable
waters and the lands beneath them.34
While much has been written about the public trust doctrine generally, and the
propriety of expanding it beyond navigable waters and underlying lands in particular,
less attention has been paid to defining the proper scope and effect of the public trust
doctrine as applied to its more traditional milieu of navigable waters and underlying
lands—e.g., where do underlying lands end and uplands begin; what uses are
protected by the doctrine?35 Resolution of these issues along the Great Lakes shores
Illustrative of concern about the public trust doctrine, and its effect upon private property
rights and takings, is the brouhaha that led to a recent amendment of the Ohio Constitution.
Opponents of ratification of the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources
Compact, designed to protect against diversion of Great Lakes waters out of the Great Lakes
basin and to promote wiser use of water resources within the basin, claimed that passage of the
Compact would extend the public trust doctrine to non-navigable waters and groundwater in
Ohio, thereby jeopardizing private property rights in such waters. As a result of negotiations
that allowed the Ohio legislature to ratify the Compact, a proposed constitutional amendment
was added to the ballot in November 2008 that specified, inter alia, that landowners have
property rights in non-navigable waters and groundwater in Ohio and that such waters are not
subject to the public trust doctrine. S.J. Res. 8, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2008).
The amendment passed by a landslide and took effect Dec. 1, 2008. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19b.
34

Among the most controversial and expansive applications of the public trust doctrine in
recent decades are those in California and New Jersey. The California Supreme Court
invoked the doctrine to protect non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters, adversely
impacting holders of rights to appropriate waters from those tributaries. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y
v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). The New Jersey Supreme Court held, in reliance
on the doctrine, that the public had rights to use privately owned, dry sand ocean beaches
above the high water mark. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J.
1984). See also In re Water Use Permit Applications for the Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409
(Haw. 2000) (applying public trust doctrine to groundwater connected to surface waters).
35
This is not to say that books and articles have completely ignored these issues. Among
those that address the geographic scope of, and uses protected by, the public trust doctrine,
albeit not with a focus on the Great Lakes, is SLADE ET AL., supra note 5.

Additionally, in the aftermath of the Michigan Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Glass v.
Goeckel, a number of articles addressed the public’s right to walk along the shores of the
Great Lakes, though primarily from a Michigan law perspective. See, e.g., Jonathan Burleigh,
Note, Don’t Fence Me Out: What Are the Rights and Responsibilities of the Public and
Riparian Landowners After Glass v. Goeckel?, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 499 (2007); Eric
Nelson, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes: Glass v. Goeckel, 11 ALBANY L.
ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 131 (2006); Carl Shadi Paganelli, Note, Creative Judicial
Misunderstanding: Misapplication of the Public Trust Doctrine in Michigan, 58 HASTINGS
L.J. 1095 (2007); Nathan Piwowarski, Comment, Trouble at the Water’s Edge: Michigan
Should Not Extend the Public Trust Doctrine of the Great Lakes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1045
(2006). One exception is Robert Haskell Abrams, Walking the Beach to the Core of
Sovereignty: The Historic Basis for the Public Trust Doctrine Applied in Glass v. Goeckel, 40
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861 (2007), in which Professor Abrams primarily argues that the
Michigan Supreme Court’s decision is correct based on the history of the public trust doctrine
but also mentions that it is consonant with the law in other Great Lakes states. See also
Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways and Submerged
Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907 (2007) (explores the public
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will be the emphases of the remainder of this Article. Preliminarily, however, a brief
discussion of some other legal principles relevant to the shores of the Great Lakes
should help provide context for our evaluation of the scope and effect of the public
trust doctrine.
In general, as will be discussed in more detail below, states own the beds of the
Great Lakes,36 and private parties often own the littoral lands bordering the lakes.37
The boundary for title purposes between privately owned littoral lands and stateowned beds often is defined as the “ordinary high water mark” along the shore,38 but
depending upon the state and the parcel in question, the boundary may be defined
differently (e.g., low water mark, water’s edge).39
The levels of the Great Lakes are not appreciably affected by the tides, but rather
rise and fall seasonally during the year.40 The highest levels typically occur in the
summer, with the lowest levels in the winter; the average difference in lake levels
between summer and winter each year is about twelve to eighteen inches.41
Primarily due to changes in annual weather conditions, the levels of the Great Lakes
also vary year to year; for example, the average levels of the lakes one year may be a
foot higher or lower than the average levels the next year.42 As a result, the high

trust doctrine in the Great Lakes states more generally, and argues for a geographic scope
including streams capable of recreational boating and for more protected uses); Diana V. Pratt,
The Legal Rights of the Public in the Foreshores of the Great Lakes, 10 MICH. REAL PROP.
REV. 237 (1983) (a brief, early exploration of the public’s rights to use the Great Lakes
shores).
36

See infra Part V.

37

The vast majority of lands bordering the Great Lakes are privately owned. SLADE ET
supra note 5, at 2 (ninety percent of all land in the United States bordering oceans and
Great Lakes is privately owned).
AL.,

38

“Ordinary high water mark” is discussed in more detail in Part IV.A.1.a infra. In short,
for purposes of the Great Lakes, the ordinary high water mark is the highest point on the shore
where the water periodically stands and leaves a mark, not the highest point the water reaches
during extraordinary events such as floods or severe storms.
39
See infra Parts III-V. In short, the low water mark is the lowest point on the shore
where the water periodically stands. The water’s edge has been interpreted to mean the point
on the shore where the water currently stands.
40

See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 435-36; Glass, 703 N.W.2d 58, 98-99 (Markman, J.,
dissenting).
41
U.S. ARMY CORPS
(1999).

OF

ENG’RS & GREAT LAKES COMM’N, LIVING

WITH THE

LAKES 16

42

See NOAA GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH LABORATORY, WATER LEVELS OF
GREAT LAKES (Jan. 2009). The annual average lake levels over the past century vary less
than two feet from highest to lowest. Id. Short-term fluctuations in lake levels can be more
extreme than monthly or annual averages. Over the past century, the range from extreme high
to extreme low water levels has been nearly four feet for Lake Superior and more than six feet
for the other Great Lakes. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & GREAT LAKES COMM’N, supra note
41, at 17.
THE
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water mark, low water mark, and water’s edge are not permanent locations on the
shore, but rather may move landward or lakeward.43
At common law, the general rule is that gradual and imperceptible changes to the
shoreline result in the boundary moving with those changes.44 That is, the boundary
is a movable freehold. Certain changes benefit the state and move the boundary
landward: erosion is the gradual process of material being eroded from the shore,
causing the shoreline to recede and water to invade the former upland, and
submergence is the gradual disappearance of upland due to rising water. Other
changes benefit the littoral owner and move the boundary lakeward: reliction (land
that was once submerged becomes exposed through the gradual recession of water)
and accretion (uplands enlarge through the gradual deposit of material by the water).
By contrast, sudden changes in the shoreline (e.g., due to a major storm) are
considered avulsion, and the property boundary does not move with such avulsive
changes.45 In general, a littoral owner cannot benefit from her own acts that result in
artificial changes to the shoreline.46
Although littoral owners typically do not own into the beds of the Great Lakes,
they enjoy common law rights or privileges beyond those of the general public.
These littoral rights typically include the right to access the lake, the right to wharf
out to deeper water in order to use the lake for navigation, and the right to make
reasonable use of the water. These rights are not absolute, however, and are subject
to regulation, the rights of other littoral owners and the public, and they cannot
interfere with navigation.47
43

Some states have defined the ordinary high water mark (“OHWM”), at least for certain
purposes, as a specific elevation. For example, Indiana has administratively defined the
OHWM for Lake Michigan to be 581.5 feet, International Great Lakes Datum 1985. While
the OHWM in Indiana stays constant vertically, the location of the OHWM on the shore may
horizontally change landward or lakeward due to physical changes to the shoreline caused by
erosion or accretion. Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res., Lake Michigan: Ordinary High Watermark,
available at http://www.in.gov/dnr/water/3658.htm (last visited May 27, 2010). International
Great Lakes Datum (IGLD) is a reference system by which Great Lakes water levels are
measured. The most recent is IGLD 1985. Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res., Lake Michigan:
International Great Lakes Datum, available at http://www.in.gov/dnr/water/3659.htm (last
visited May 27, 2010).
44

SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 535.

45

BRUCE FLUSHMAN, WATER BOUNDARIES: DEMYSTIFYING LAND BOUNDARIES ADJACENT
TIDAL OR NAVIGABLE WATERS §§ 3.11, 3.12 (2002); SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 535-36;
Abrams, supra note 35, at 898-902.
TO

46

FLUSHMAN, supra note 45, at § 3.12.2; SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 110.

47

SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 35. An alleged taking of littoral rights is the focus of a case
currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. In Stop the Beach Nourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 08-1151 (U.S., argued Dec. 2, 2009), a group of Florida
beachfront property owners are claiming that a state beach restoration statute
unconstitutionally took without compensation their littoral right to have their properties
contact the ocean water, and alternatively that the state supreme court engaged in a “judicial
taking” by holding that such contact is not a constitutionally protected littoral right. See Save
Our Beaches, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2006 WL 1112700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006), rev’d sub nom. Walton County v. Stop the Beach Nourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102
(Fla. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 2792 (June 15, 2009).
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III. RECENT CASES ILLUSTRATE THE PROBLEM
At one level, the application of the public trust doctrine to the Great Lakes and its
underlying lands is non-controversial. As early as Illinois Central, the Supreme
Court expressly held that the public trust doctrine applies to the Great Lakes and the
lands underlying them.48 But as recent cases in Michigan and Ohio show, there is
much controversy and uncertainty about whether, and to what extent and effect, the
public trust doctrine applies to the shores of the Great Lakes.
A. Michigan
Michigan was the first Great Lakes state to squarely decide whether the public
has a right to walk along the shores of the Great Lakes. The Michigan Supreme
Court in Glass v. Goeckel49 ruled in 2005 that the public trust protects the right of the
public to walk on even privately owned property along the Great Lakes above the
water’s edge up to the ordinary high water mark.
Glass v. Goeckel began as a local dispute between neighbors and metastasized
into a battle between private property rights groups and public interest organizations
over Michigan’s three thousand miles of Great Lakes shores.50 Although the suit
originally was commenced by plaintiff Glass to enforce an express easement
elsewhere on Goeckel’s lakefront property,51 at issue on appeal was Goeckel’s claim
that Glass was trespassing on Goeckel’s private property by walking laterally along
the Lake Huron shore near but above the water’s edge.52 The State of Michigan
owns the bed of Lake Huron, as it does the beds of all of the Great Lakes within its
borders.53 But for purposes of this appeal, it was undisputed that Goeckel’s title to
the property extended at least to the water’s edge and that Glass was walking as a
member of the public on Goeckel’s property between the water’s edge and the
ordinary high water mark.54 The Michigan court of appeals ruled in favor of
defendant Goeckel, holding that the public trust was limited to submerged lands, as
evaluated moment to moment; that the littoral owner held exclusive use of the shore

48

Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37 (1892).

49

Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005).

50
Amici curiae in the case included the Michigan Land Use Institute, Defenders of
Property Rights, Save Our Shoreline, Great Lakes Coalition, Inc., Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation, Michigan
Bankers Association, Michigan Hotel, Motel and Resort Association, Tip of the Mitt
Watershed Council, National Wildlife Federation, Michigan United Conservation Clubs, and
various members of the Michigan legislature, as well as the Michigan Departments of
Environmental Quality and Natural Resources. Id. at 60-61.
51

Id. at 63.

52

Id.

53

See, e.g., Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159 (Mich. 1930); Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51
(Mich. 1926).
54

Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 61-63.
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above the water’s edge; and that neither Glass nor any other member of the public
had a right to traverse the shore above the water’s edge.55
The Michigan Supreme Court via a 5-2 decision reversed, holding that the public
trust doctrine provides Glass and other members of the public with the right to walk
along the shore of the Great Lakes up to the ordinary high water mark.56 The Court
ruled that the State of Michigan has a sovereign obligation to protect and preserve
the waters of the Great Lakes and the land beneath them for the public, and that the
state serves as the trustee of public rights in the Great Lakes for fishing, hunting, and
boating for commerce or pleasure.57 Further, the Court made clear that the
geographic scope of the public’s rights was not necessarily co-extensive with the
boundary between publicly and privately owned land. Although the state has
authority to convey title to lands underlying the Great Lakes to private parties (jus
privatum), the private party takes such property subject to the public trust (jus
publicum).58
Noting that when applying the public trust doctrine to oceans courts traditionally
have held that the public’s rights extend up to the ordinary high water mark,59 the
Court acknowledged that the term “ordinary high water mark” has a less obvious
meaning when applied to non-tidal waters like the Great Lakes.60 Nevertheless,
because the levels of the Great Lakes fluctuate, the Court reasoned that the public
trust should similarly extend to the shores of the Great Lakes that are sometimes
submerged, and the Court borrowed Wisconsin’s definition of ordinary high water
mark: the point on the shore up to which the presence of water is so continuous as to
leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other
easily recognized characteristics.61
The Michigan Supreme Court went on to hold that walking along the shore
between the ordinary high water mark and the water’s edge was a protected public
trust activity. The traditionally articulated rights protected by the public trust
doctrine in Michigan are fishing, hunting, and navigation for commerce or pleasure.
Reasoning that the public must be able to walk below the ordinary high water mark
in order to engage in such protected activities, the Court held that the right to walk
along the shore below the high water mark likewise is protected by the public trust.62
The Court concluded with two caveats: the public trust doctrine does not protect
every public use of private land below the ordinary high water mark, and exercise of
protected public rights remains subject to regulation.63
55
Id. at 63. See also Glass v. Goeckel, 683 N.W.2d 719 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (court of
appeals opinion).
56

Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62.

57

Id. at 64-65.

58

Id. at 64-66 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894)).

59

Id. at 68.

60

Id. at 71.

61

Id. at 71-72 (quoting Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914)).

62

Id. at 74.

63

Id. at 75.
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The dissenting justices did not dispute the existence of the public trust with
respect to the Great Lakes and its underlying lands, but urged that the public trust
geographically extended only to the water’s edge.64 Both dissenters agreed, though,
that the public trust afforded the public the right to walk along the shore below the
water’s edge, even if the shore were privately owned.65
B. Ohio
In Ohio, by contrast, in Merrill v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources66 the
Ohio court of appeals in August 2009 held that the public has no right to use the
shore of Lake Erie above the water’s edge, because the public trust ends at the
water’s edge.
The Merrill case was initiated by lakefront property owners along Lake Erie,
challenging an Ohio Department of Natural Resources policy requiring the littoral
owners to obtain leases if they wanted to build structures (e.g., docks, wharves,
piers) below the ordinary high water mark, even where the littoral owners’ deeds
indicated their title extended to the water’s edge or lower.67 The state claimed it
owns the beds of Lake Erie and the shore up to the ordinary high water mark, urging
that Ohio had held such land in trust since it became a state in 1803.68 Plaintiffs
sought a declaration that they own the shore below the ordinary high water mark, as
described in their deeds, and furthermore that the public trust extends no further
landward than the water’s edge.69 Environmental groups intervened as defendants,
urging that their members have rights to make recreational use of the shore up to the
ordinary high water mark pursuant to the public trust doctrine.70
Ruling on cross motions for summary judgment, the Lake County Court of
Common Pleas addressed the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine and the
rights of the public, as well as the rights and duties of the state and littoral owners,
64
Id. at 79-81 (Young, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 81-107
(Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65

Id. at 85 & n.10 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, the
dissenters seemingly would permit the public to walk on “wet sands” even slightly above the
actual water’s edge, because they are infused with water and constitute submerged lands. Id.
at 101. Justice Young joined in most of Justice Markman’s opinion. Id. at 81 (Young, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66
State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., Nos. 2008-L-007 & 2008-L-008,
2009 WL 2591758 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2009), notices of appeal filed, No. 2009-1806
(Ohio Oct. 7, 2009). The Court of Appeals largely affirmed the 2007 decision in the case by
the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res.,
No. 04CV001080, 2007 WL 4910860 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 11, 2007) (order granting
plaintiffs’ motions for partial summary judgment in part and denying defendants’ motions for
summary judgment).
67

Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶¶ 2, 4, 28-30.

68

Id. ¶ 6. The State of Ohio argued that the OHWM for Lake Erie had been
administratively established as 573.4 feet (IGLD 1985) by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Id. ¶ 2.
69

Id. ¶¶ 2-5, 9-14, 24, 28-30.

70

Id. ¶¶ 16, 46-49.
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with respect to the shores of Lake Erie.71 The trial court held that the boundary line
for purposes of title and the public trust is the water’s edge, “wherever that moveable
boundary may be at any given time.”72 According to the trial court, the state owns
below the water’s edge and the littoral owners own above the water’s edge; hence
the court reformed the deeds and instructed that the state cannot require leases above
the water’s edge.73 The trial court ruled that the public can boat, fish, and recreate
below the water’s edge pursuant to the public trust doctrine, but the public has no
rights above the water’s edge, and the littoral owners can lawfully exclude the public
from the exposed shore above the water’s edge.74
The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District, except for the deed
reformation, affirmed the common pleas court decision.75 Acknowledging that the
case was one of first impression in Ohio,76 the court of appeals held that the water’s
edge serves as the line of demarcation between the lands owned in trust by the state
underlying Lake Erie and the privately owned lands of the littoral owners.77 Looking
to language from earlier Ohio Supreme Court cases,78 as well as to the term “natural
shoreline” in a statute it described as codifying the public trust doctrine,79 the court
of appeals concluded that the water’s edge is the landward boundary for the public
trust doctrine along the shore of Lake Erie in Ohio.80 The court found the water’s
71

Id. ¶¶ 18-31; Merrill, 2007 WL 4910860, ¶¶ 250-255.

72

Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 30; Merrill, 2007 WL 4910860, ¶ 243.

73

Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶¶ 28-30; Merrill, 2007 WL 4910860, ¶¶ 250-251.

74

Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 49; Merrill, 2007 WL 4910860, ¶¶ 250-252.

75

The court of appeals vacated the common pleas court order only insofar as it reformed
deeds, ruling that reformation of deeds was not before the trial court and the parties were not
afforded the opportunity to argue their positions regarding the issue. Merrill, 2009 WL
2591758, ¶ 103. Otherwise, the court of appeals affirmed the common pleas court order. Id. ¶
131. The court of appeals praised the “immensely scholarly opinion of the trial court,”
attaching it as an appendix to its own opinion. Id ¶ 59.
76

Id. ¶ 1.

77

Id. ¶¶ 127-29. Interestingly, the majority in Merrill held that the State of Ohio lacked
standing to pursue the appeal. Id. ¶¶ 41-44. In July 2007, the Ohio Department of Natural
Resources, as directed by the governor, abandoned its policy that gave rise to the lawsuit—i.e.,
requiring Lake Erie littoral owners to lease land below the ordinary high water mark even if
the land was within the terms of their deeds. Since “[t]he governor has ordered ODNR to
cease those activities that made it a party to the action,” the majority ruled that the Ohio
Attorney General, who represented the State of Ohio in the case, lacked authority to proceed
with the appeal. Id. ¶ 44. Because intervenors National Wildlife Federation and Ohio
Environmental Council essentially had adopted the state’s arguments, see id. ¶ 23, the court of
appeals decided the appeal on the merits. One of the three judges concurred with the majority
on the merits but dissented on the standing issue. Id. ¶ 134-36 (Cannon, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). Both the State of Ohio and the environmental groups have sought review
by the Ohio Supreme Court. State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., No. 20091806 (Ohio, notices of appeal filed Oct. 7, 2009).
78

Id. ¶¶ 60-71, 123-27.

79

Id. ¶ 67 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1506.10, 1506.11 (West 2009)).

80

Id. ¶¶ 127-29.
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edge to be synonymous with “shoreline,” which it defined as the line of actual
physical contact by the water with the shore, undisturbed and under normal
conditions.81 According to the court, the state owns the lakebed in trust below the
water’s edge and the littoral owners own above the water’s edge.82 Reasoning that
the littoral owner has the right to exclude the public from her property, the court held
that the public has no right to use the privately owned shore of Lake Erie above the
water’s edge.83
The court of appeals acknowledged that the public trust doctrine affords the
public a right to walk along the shore of Lake Erie, but only lakeward of the water’s
edge.84 That is, a member of the public is entitled to walk in the waters of Lake Erie,
but he has no right to walk landward of the water’s edge on privately-owned,
exposed shore.85
C. The Problem
The Michigan and Ohio cases demonstrate that, when ascertaining the scope and
effect of the public trust doctrine with respect to the public’s right to walk the shores
of the Great Lakes, there is little consensus regarding approach or result. In the
Michigan case, the trial court, the court of appeals, the supreme court majority, and
the dissenting justices expressed at least four different viewpoints regarding the
application of the public trust to the Great Lakes shores in the context of deciding
whether the public had a right to walk along the shore above the water’s edge, with
varying results.86 The Ohio case reflected yet another approach to the application of
the public trust doctrine to the Great Lakes shores, with still another result.87
The confusion and controversy over the application of the public trust doctrine to
the shores of the Great Lakes, including the public’s right to walk on privately
owned land above the water’s edge, certainly is not limited to Michigan and Ohio.
In Wisconsin, in the aftermath of Michigan’s Glass v. Goeckel decision, apparently
many were surprised to learn that the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
takes the position that, notwithstanding state ownership of the shores of the Great
Lakes up to the ordinary high water mark, the public has no right to walk along the
shores above the water’s edge because the littoral owner has exclusive right to use
the shore between the ordinary high water mark and the water’s edge.88 The

81
Id. ¶¶ 97, 127. The appeals court defined “shore” as the area between the high and low
water marks. Id. ¶ 97.
82

Id. ¶¶ 127-29.

83

Id. ¶ 89.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

See Glass v. Goeckel, 683 N.W.2d 719 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 703 N.W.2d 58
(Mich. 2005).
87
State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., Nos. 2008-L-007 & 2008-L-008,
2009 WL 2591758 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2009).
88

See WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., THE ORDINARY HIGH WATER MARK,
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/water/wm/dsfm/shore/ohwm.htm (last visited May. 27, 2010); see also
Pratt, supra note 35, at 246-47. The rule enforced by the Wisconsin DNR is “keep your feet
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agency’s position is based on a 1923 Wisconsin Supreme Court case.89 An editorial
in one of Wisconsin’s leading newspapers described the situation as “ridiculous” and
called for a change in the law to allow the public to walk along the shores of the
Great Lakes without the necessity of keeping their feet wet.90
A decade ago in Pennsylvania, the Department of Environmental Protection
published a Public Access Policy that stated the public had a right of foot access
along privately owned shore of Lake Erie in the “public easement area” between the
ordinary high and low water marks.91 However, the department continued to receive
many questions regarding the public’s right to walk the shore of Lake Erie, and it is
not clear whether the policy is still in effect. 92
It is vital that the public trust doctrine be applied correctly to the Great Lakes
shores. The public trust doctrine tries to strike a balance between the rights of the
public to use important natural resources and the rights of littoral landowners to use
their property.93 Where the law tips too far in favor of the littoral landowners,
important public resources effectively are monopolized by a few. Where the law tilts
too far in favor of the public, valuable private property rights get trampled by the
many. If the law is uncertain, the public may trespass on or interfere with private
property rights by overestimating the public’s rights to use the shore (e.g., walking
too far from the water’s edge, engaging in intrusive non-protected uses).
Alternatively, the public may not fully exercise their rights to use the shore, and the
state may fail to protect the shore from littoral owners who overestimate their own
rights and interfere with the trust resources (e.g., erecting a structure).94 Further, the
federal government has predicted that global warming may cause nearly a two-foot
drop in the average level of the Great Lakes by the end of this century.95 As lake
levels drop, there is significantly more exposed shore inviting public use. Plus, there
is more impetus for littoral owners to construct new development (e.g., wharves) to
wet”—i.e., you can walk the shore, but only below the water’s edge. The public trust doctrine
regarding the Great Lakes in Wisconsin is discussed in Part V.H infra.
89

Doemel v. Jantz, 193 N.W. 393 (Wis. 1923) (involving Lake Winnebago).

90

Ricardo Pimentel, Editorial, Lake Michigan Beaches: What Is a ‘Public Use’?,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 20, 2006, at A16.
91
See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., PENNSYLVANIA COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS 2000-2001, available at http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/subject/
advcoun/czac/CZAC00hilites.html (last visited May. 27 2010).
92

PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., PENNSYLVANIA COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
HIGHLIGHTS 2001-2002, at 5-6 (Jul. 17, 2002), available at http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/
subject/advcoun/czac/2002/ czac0102hilites.pdf (last visited May. 27, 2010).
93

See Smith & Sweeney, supra note 13, at 309; Thompson, supra note 7, at 59-60.

94

See Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Notice and Expectation Under Bounded Uncertainty:
Defining Evolving Property Rights Boundaries Through Public Trust and Takings, 21 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 233 (2008) (describing similar problems for the state, public, and private owners
due to uncertainty regarding the public trust doctrine).
95

U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 119 (Karl et al. eds., 2009) (higher temperatures mean greater evaporation).
Due to the slope of the shore in many places along the Great Lakes, a one-foot drop in water
level can mean a significant increase in newly exposed shore. Id.
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access the more distant water, and there is more room on the shore for them to
develop, all of which could interfere with public use of the shore. Accordingly, a
principled legal approach that leads to the proper and predictable application of the
public trust doctrine along the Great Lakes shores is critical.
IV. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Public trust law is not uniform throughout the Great Lakes region because, at
least in part, the scope of the doctrine in each state is a function of that individual
state’s laws. Indeed, as discussed in more detail below, the Supreme Court has
stated that “the individual [s]tates have the authority to define the limits of the lands
held in public trust.”96 Nevertheless, as also discussed below, states are not
unfettered in establishing the scope of the public trust doctrine. This part of the
Article argues that the scope of the public trust doctrine with respect to the Great
Lakes shores in each state should be determined by using a uniform analytical
framework, based on the core principles of the public trust doctrine. The dispute
regarding the public’s right to walk along the shores of the Great Lakes serves as the
focal point for discussion of my proposed framework.
The public trust doctrine, as mentioned above, traditionally has applied to
navigable waters and their underlying lands, to protect their use by the public for
navigation, fishing, and commerce.97 But, as reflected by Glass v. Goeckel in
Michigan and Merrill v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources in Ohio, whether the
public trust doctrine provides the public a right to walk along the shore of the Great
Lakes above the water’s edge is hotly disputed. Using my proposed framework,
resolution of the dispute in each state requires an examination of two questions: (1)
Does the public trust geographically extend to Great Lakes shores above the water’s
edge? (2) Is walking the shore a public use protected by the public trust doctrine?
A. Geographic Scope
Preliminarily, it is important to emphasize that the scope of the public trust
doctrine does not depend on whether the land is currently owned by the state. In
general, the beds of the Great Lakes are owned by the states, not private parties.98
The landward boundary between state-owned beds and privately owned uplands
differs from state to state. As discussed in Part V below, some states recognize
ownership in the state up to the high water mark on the shore,99 while other states
own only up to the low water mark.100 The boundary for public trust purposes,
though, need not be the same as the boundary for title purposes.

96

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988); see also Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 40 (1894).
97

See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37, 452 (1892); SAX ET AL., supra
note 1, at 590.
98

See infra Part V.

99

For example, Indiana and Wisconsin recognize ownership up to the high water mark.
See infra Parts V.D. & V.H.
100

For example, Pennsylvania and Minnesota recognize ownership only up to the low
water mark. See infra Parts V.G & V.E.
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English common law centuries ago established that the public trust doctrine can
apply to lands no longer owned by the crown. Differentiating between the jus
privatum and the jus publicum, English common law made clear that although the
crown could transfer title to lands underlying navigable waters to a private party, the
crown continues to hold the land in trust for the people to use.101 The U.S. Supreme
Court in the Nineteenth Century likewise recognized that while the states could
transfer title to lands underlying navigable waters to a private party, the lands
remained subject to the public trust for the people to use for purposes including
navigation and fishing.102
1. The Starting Point
But what defines the landward boundary of the lands underlying navigable waters
subject to the public trust doctrine, if not state ownership? In my framework, the
starting point for the analysis is the lands that passed to the Great Lakes states in
trust when they first became states. As previously mentioned, lands subject to the
public trust doctrine underlying navigable waters have both jus privatum and jus
publicum interests. While the jus privatum can be transferred by the government to a
private party, the jus publicum remains with the government to hold in trust for the
people. That the land was burdened with the jus publicum before the private party
acquired the jus privatum is what makes the public trust doctrine such an effective
shield against a takings claim. If the private title holder claims her property has been
taken because she is forced to allow the public to use the property (or because the
state restricts her use of the property in order to preserve a protected public use), the
state can urge that there has been no taking because her property always has been
subject to the public’s right to use the land and thus there has been no change in her
private property rights in the land.103 Hence, to avoid any argument that by
recognizing the public trust doctrine the state is taking private property without
compensation, the starting point for ascertaining the current scope of the public trust
doctrine in a state should begin with those lands that the state originally held in
trust.104
101

Hale, supra note 11; see Shively, 152 U.S. at 11-13.

102

Shively, 152 U.S. at 56; Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452-54.

103

See, e.g., Kleinsasser, supra note 33, at 437-38; Lazarus, supra note 16, at 649; Klass,
supra note 6, at 739-42. It is more problematic and controversial to impose anew a jus
publicum interest on privately owned land that was never before subject to this public interest.
See James Huffman, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: A Hidden Victory for Private
Property?, 19 Envtl. L. Rptr. 10051, 10055-56 (1989) (arguing that recognition of public trust
in properties beyond what states originally owned constitutes a taking) [hereinafter, Huffman,
Hidden Victory]. However, the public trust doctrine is dynamic, see Marks v. Whitney, 491
P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (“sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs”), and
the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that background principles can evolve for purposes of
takings analysis, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (“changed
circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so”).
104
Where the land is now owned by the state, however, the state could choose to apply the
public trust doctrine to lands not originally subject to the public trust. For example, in some
states, state-owned parks can be subject to the public trust. See, e.g., Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg.
Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970); Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York., 750
N.E.2d 1050 (N.Y. 2001).
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a. The Equal Footing Doctrine
Identifying those lands that originally passed to a state in trust implicates the
equal footing doctrine. Both the equal footing doctrine and the public trust doctrine
are grounded in the importance of navigable waters and the lands underlying them,
and several of the same Supreme Court cases have shaped and linked both
doctrines.105 The equal footing doctrine provides that each new state that enters the
Union receives title to the lands underlying navigable and tidal waters within its
boundaries, absent a clear pre-statehood grant or reservation by the federal
government.106 The equal footing doctrine originated in Pollard v. Hagan,107 in
which the Court held that Alabama had obtained title to the lands underlying tidal
waters within its borders when it was admitted to the Union. The Pollard Court
based its decision, in part, upon the statehood clause of the U.S. Constitution108 and
the terms of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which provided that new states would
enter the Union “on an equal footing with the original States.”109 The Supreme Court
earlier, in Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee,110 had held that the original thirteen states
acquired from the crown upon the American Revolution lands underlying tidal
waters, which the crown had held in trust for use by the people for navigation and
fishing. Due to the importance of navigable waters, the Pollard Court held that for
Alabama to enter the Union on an equal sovereign footing with the original states, it
must have received ownership of the lands underlying such tidal waters when it
became a state; hence the Court ruled that the federal government had no power to
transfer land underlying tidal water in Alabama post-statehood since the land already

105
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Shively, 152 U.S. 1. A
number of commentators have noted a strong link between the equal footing doctrine and the
public trust doctrine. See, e.g., Huffman, Hidden Victory, supra note 103, at 10053-56;
Rasband, supra note 10; Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 426-27.
106

See, e.g., Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 197 (1987).

107

Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).

108
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union . . . .”).
109

Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, art. V, 1 STAT. 50, 53 (1789). The Northwest
Ordinance further specified that “[t]he navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St.
Lawrence, . . . shall be common highways, and forever free.” Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
ch. 8, art. IV, 1 STAT. 50, 52 (1789). The Northwest Ordinance created the Northwest
Territory from lands northwest of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi River. The
original states relinquished their claims to the lands in the Northwest Territory to the federal
government, and the Northwest Ordinance set forth the terms and process by which new states
would be created from the Northwest Territory. Originally enacted in 1787 pursuant to the
Articles of Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance was re-adopted by Congress following
ratification of the Constitution. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, 1 STAT. 50-53
(1789); Rasband, supra note 10, at 31-33.
110

Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). The Illinois Central Court
relied heavily upon Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee and an earlier New Jersey Supreme Court
case, Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821), to support its finding that Illinois held the beds
of Lake Michigan in trust. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456-57 (1892).
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had passed to the state.111 It is now well settled that the equal footing doctrine
applies to all new states entering the Union,112 and that new states received title to
lands underlying waters actually navigable as well as those subject to the ebb and
flow of tides.113
The Court in Shively v. Bowlby,114 correcting dicta in Pollard, clarified that states
received title to lands underlying navigable waters upon entering the Union, absent a
clear pre-statehood grant or reservation by the federal government. The Shively
Court was faced with the question of whether the United States had made a prestatehood grant of land below the high water mark of the Columbia River to plaintiff,
or whether such land had passed to the defendant State of Oregon when it entered the
Union. Re-affirming the equal footing doctrine, the Court held that title to the lands
underlying navigable waters passed to newly admitted states, absent a clear prestatehood grant or reservation by the federal government of such lands.115 The Court
found no such clear pre-statehood grant in this case and ruled the State of Oregon
owned the riverbed.116 Importantly, the Court ruled that, prior to Oregon becoming a
state, the federal government held the lands underlying navigable waters in trust for
the future state. Contrary to Pollard dicta, the Court ruled that the federal
government had the power to make pre-statehood grants of land below the high
water mark of navigable waters, at least under certain exceptional circumstances.117
The Court, though, found that in light of the public trust interest in such lands and
navigable waters—for commerce, navigation, and fishing—the policy of the United
States had been not to make such pre-statehood grants.118 Since then, only rarely
have pre-statehood grants or reservations by the federal government been found to
defeat title passing to the new states under the equal footing doctrine for lands
underlying navigable waters.119
111

Pollard, 44 U.S. at 230.

112

Although the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 applied by its terms only to those states
formed from the Northwest Territory (i.e., Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin),
its “equal footing” language became a model for the enabling acts of all new states. See
SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 19.
113

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Barney v. City of Keokuk,
94 U.S. 324 (1876).
114

Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).

115

Id. at 26, 48, 57-58.

116

Id. at 58.

117

The Court stated:
[C]ongress has the power to make grants of lands below high-water mark of navigable
waters in any territory of the United States, whenever it becomes necessary to do so in
order to perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of such lands
for the promotion and convenience of commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states, or to carry out other public purposes appropriate to the objects for
which the United States hold the territory.
Id. at 48.
118

Id. at 48-49.

119

See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 197-98 (1987) (general
rule); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (rare exception).
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Perhaps even more importantly, the Shively Court identified a further link
between the public trust doctrine and the lands underlying navigable waters, which
the states received pursuant to the equal footing doctrine. Acknowledging that states
could choose to cede title to lands underlying navigable waters to private parties, the
Court also recognized that the states retained a trust obligation for those lands and
the public still had rights to make use of those lands, even where the states no longer
owned those lands. The Shively Court traced the history of the public trust doctrine,
and the concepts of jus publicum and jus privatum, from England to the United
States, and the Court noted that in states where title was privately owned to the low
water mark, the public continued to have rights to navigate and fish up to the high
water mark.120 Although the holding in Shively was based on the equal footing
doctrine, the Supreme Court has termed Shively the “seminal case in American
public trust jurisprudence.”121
More recently, the Court re-affirmed the linkage between lands passing pursuant
to the equal footing doctrine and the public trust doctrine. In Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Mississippi,122 the Court held that the State of Mississippi received title to
tidelands pursuant to the equal footing doctrine since they were subject to the ebb
and flow, even though the waters overlying the tidelands were not actually
navigable. The Court found that Mississippi had acquired title to the tidelands when
it entered the Union, continued to hold the tidelands in trust thereafter, had not
relinquished title to the tidelands, and hence was still the owner of the tidelands—
notwithstanding that private owners had held record title and paid taxes on the
tidelands for decades.123 In so ruling, the Court acknowledged that although some
states have chosen to recognize private title to such tidelands, those lands
nevertheless had passed to the states pursuant to the equal footing doctrine, and the
public still had rights to use those lands for protected uses under the public trust
doctrine.124
So, what does the equal footing doctrine instruct regarding the lands underlying
navigable waters received in trust by the states when they joined the Union? First,
120

Shively, 152 U.S. at 11-25.

121

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473 (1988).

122

Id.

123

Id. at 483-84 & n.12. Mississippi wanted to lease the tidelands to another private party
for mineral exploration. Because mineral exploration is not a protected use under the public
trust doctrine, the state needed to claim ownership of the tidelands, whereupon it could lease
them for mineral development as a permissible public purpose consistent with the public trust
doctrine. The Court held that whether events subsequent to statehood had transferred title to
the record owners was a matter of state law, and the Court upheld the Mississippi Supreme
Court’s determination that no such transfer had occurred under Mississippi law. Id. at 483-85.
124
Id. at 483-84 & n.12. Commentators, even those hostile to the public trust doctrine,
have recognized the link between the lands that passed to the states pursuant to the equal
footing doctrine and the lands the states hold in trust for use by the people. Huffman, Hidden
Victory, supra note 103, at 10053-56 (equating geographic scope of public trust doctrine to
lands states acquired pursuant to the equal footing doctrine, and arguing states cannot extend
public trust doctrine to lands not previously in state ownership). See also Sylvia Quast &
Michael Mantell, Role of the States, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 67, 69 (Donald
C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton eds., 2008); Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 426-27.
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navigable waters for purposes of the equal footing doctrine mean waters that were
navigable in fact, or were subject to the ebb and flow of the tides, at the time of the
state’s admission.125 Waters are navigable in fact when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce,
over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade
and travel.126 The Great Lakes unquestionably are navigable waters for purposes of
the equal footing doctrine.
Second, my research indicates that the boundary for lands underlying navigable
waters for purposes of the equal footing doctrine is, as a matter of federal law, the
“ordinary high water mark” (OHWM). That is, the lands underlying navigable
waters that passed from the federal government to each new state at the time of
admission extended to the OHWM.
Multiple Supreme Court cases teach that the boundary between the underlying
lands passed to the state pursuant to the equal footing doctrine and the uplands
retained by the federal government is the OHWM.127 For example, the Pollard Court
held that Alabama received title to all lands under navigable waters up to the “usual
high water-mark,”128 and the federal government had no power to grant such lands
following Alabama’s admission to the Union.129 In Phillips, the Court ruled that
pursuant to the equal footing doctrine, Mississippi acquired title upon statehood to all
tidelands inland to the mean high water mark,130 which the state then held in trust
pursuant to the public trust doctrine. In Shively, Oregon acquired title to lands under
tidal waters up to the high water mark under the equal footing doctrine, and title to
these lands passed in trust to the states.131 In so ruling, the Court noted that English
common law recognized title in the crown up to the high water mark and that lands
below the high water mark are incapable of cultivation or improvement in the same
manner as uplands.132 While many of its decisions involved the shores of tidal
waters, the Court also has held that the boundary for lands passing pursuant to the
equal footing doctrine underlying navigable freshwaters is the OHWM.133 For
125

Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 476 (waters subject to ebb and flow of tides passed to
states pursuant to equal footing doctrine, irrespective that not navigable in fact); Utah v.
United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) (whether lake was navigable in fact under federal law
determines whether lakebed passed to state upon admission pursuant to equal footing
doctrine).
126

Utah, 403 U.S. at 10; The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870). If a water body is
navigable, that the water is too shallow near shore to float a boat does not render that portion
of the water body non-navigable. See Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 480.
127
See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. 469; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894);
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
128

Pollard, 44 U.S. at 220.

129

Id. at 230. Indeed, the Pollard Court described the lands passing to the states as “[t]he
shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them.” Id.
130

Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 473.

131

Shively, 152 U.S. at 26, 51, 57-58.

132

Id. at 57-58.
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example, in Barney v. City of Keokuk,134 the Court held that Iowa took title below the
OHWM along the Mississippi River when it was admitted to the Union, relying upon
the common law and the Court’s decisions in Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee and
Pollard.135 The Court went on to explain that, even if a state permitted the shore
below OHWM to be privately owned, it would still be subject to public use.136
The equal footing doctrine and public trust doctrine cases in the Supreme Court,
although they frequently use the term “high water mark” or “ordinary high water
mark” in describing the boundary, do not provide much detail regarding how to
determine the location of such mark on the shore.137 However, other authorities fill
in the details. In England at common law, the boundary between uplands privately
owned and tidelands owned by the crown was the medium high tide line.138 That is,
the shore “over which the daily tides ebb and flow,” “the land between ordinary high
and low water mark[s],” was owned by the crown.139 When determining the
boundary of a federal grant of uplands along tidal waters, the federal government
uses the mean high tide line, determined as the average of all high tides over a period
of 18.6 years.140
For navigable waters not impacted by tides, early American common law
generally defined OHWM as the point on the shore where the presence and action of
the water are so common and usual as to leave a distinct mark.141 As with oceans,
133
See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287 (1997) (beds of navigable
lake below high water mark passed in trust to state pursuant to equal footing doctrine);
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981) (beds of navigable river below high water
mark were not reserved by Congress via treaty from passing to state upon admission).
134

Barney v. City of Keokuk , 94 U.S. 324 (1876).

135
Id. at 337-38. The Court acknowledged that some states had followed the English
common law rule and recognized private ownership of beds of actually navigable, non-tidal
rivers. But the Court emphasized that while such states could “choose to resign to the riparian
proprietor rights which properly belong to them in their sovereign capacity,” the beds and
shores of navigable rivers “properly belongs to the States by their inherent sovereignty.” Id. at
338. The Court also noted that the federal government observed the high water mark when
making surveys and grants. Id.
136

Id. at 339. See Huffman, Takings Clause, supra note 33, at 185-86 (“When states
joined the Union, they acquired title to the submerged lands between the high water marks on
navigable waters pursuant to the equal footing doctrine. Subject to the limits of the public
trust doctrine, the states were then free to dispose of the submerged lands or to recognize a
different border between the publicly owned submerged lands and private riparian lands. . . .
Whether the private riparian’s title extends to the high or low water mark, the rights associated
with that title, including the right to exclude others, have always been subject to the same
public rights that limit the rights of water users.”).
137

See FLUSHMAN, supra note 45, at 301 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has not
given the term ‘ordinary high-water mark’ any precise meaning.”).
138

See Attorney General v. Chambers, 43 Eng. Rep. 486 (1854); see also Borax Consol.
Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
139

Borax, 296 U.S. at 22-23.

140

See id. at 27.

141

See Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. 381, 427 (1852) (Curtis, J., concurring); 2 HENRY
FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATER & WATER RIGHTS § 417, at 1461 (1904); FLUSHMAN, supra

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010

23

24

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1

OHWM along shores of non-tidal waters refers to the highest level of the water
under normal conditions, not the highest level reached during extraordinary
conditions such as floods.142 OHWM is a visible mark, such as the line where
terrestrial vegetation ends or the soil changes character.143
While certain states recognized private title below the OHWM,144 it does not
change the fact that the lands underlying those navigable waters up to the OHWM
passed to the states pursuant to the equal footing doctrine. As the Court explained in
Shively, the “title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below highwater mark of navigable waters are governed by the local laws of the several
states.”145 However, the initial determination of the boundary, which passed to the
state pursuant to the equal footing doctrine, is a matter of federal law.146 Hence,
federal law, not state law, governs what the states acquired pursuant to the equal
footing doctrine.147 Indeed, it would be somewhat of a misnomer if the equal footing
doctrine provided that some states received lands up to the OHWM upon admission
to the Union while other states did not.
The conclusion that the OHWM serves as the boundary under federal law for
lands underlying navigable waters which passed to states pursuant to the equal
footing doctrine is buttressed by the fact that the OHWM also serves as the boundary
along navigable waters under federal law in other contexts. The boundary between
uplands and state-owned tidelands or river beds for purposes of a federal grant is the
OHWM as a matter of federal law.148 The federal Submerged Lands Act confirmed
that the federal government has no claim to lands underlying non-tidal navigable
waters below the OHWM.149
note 45, at § 7.10; A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW
(1988).
142

OF

WATER RIGHTS & RESOURCES § 3.09(3)(d)

Legal Institute of the Great Lakes, Public Trust Doctrine in Ohio 28 (1999).

143

See Howard, 54 U.S. at 427; 2 FARNHAM, supra note 141, at 1461 (1904); TARLOCK,
supra note 141, at § 3.09(3)(d); 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.03(a)(2), at 175-77 (Robert
E. Beck ed., 1991). Where the nature of the shore is such that a line may not be visible (e.g., a
rocky bluff), other information can be used to help determine OHWM. See State v. Trudeau,
408 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. 1987) (compare to other places on the shore of the same lake);
FLUSHMAN, supra note 45, at § 8.7.2 (lake level statistical data).
144

A few coastal states recognize title in the state for tidelands only up to the low water
mark, and several states follow the so-called English rule by which the beds of navigable
rivers are owned by riparians rather than the state. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18-26,
31 (1894); SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 70-72.
145

Shively, 152 U.S. at 40.

146

Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 376
(1977) (boundary of lands underlying navigable river which passed to state pursuant to equal
footing doctrine is determined by federal law, but federal law does not govern title issues for
such lands following a state’s admission).
147

Id.; see also Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971).

148

See Oregon, 429 U.S. 363 (riverbed); Borax Consol. Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296
U.S. 10 (tidelands).
149
43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a), 1311(a) (2006). The Submerged Lands Act was enacted in
response to United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), and relinquishes federal claims to
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Further, the boundary recognized for the federal navigational servitude is the
OHWM. The federal navigational servitude, premised on Congress’s Commerce
Clause power to regulate navigable waters,150 permits the federal government to
displace or destroy property rights, which would ordinarily be compensable as
takings of private property without just compensation, in order to promote
navigability.151 As a matter of federal law, the navigational servitude extends to the
OHWM along navigable waters. Although there may not be one uniform definition
of OHWM for purposes of the navigational servitude, it essentially means the point
on the shore where the water stands sufficiently long to destroy vegetation below it
or otherwise create a visible line.152
Moreover, that some states did not recognize title in the states up to the OHWM
certainly does not mean that the trust obligations passed to the states upon their
admission did not extend to the OHWM. As discussed above, the federal
government held the lands underlying navigable waters in trust for future states.
Consistent with the concepts of jus privatum and jus publicum, a state could choose
to relinquish title below the OHWM to a private party. But the state could not
simply relinquish the trust obligation inherited from the federal government, and the
state continued to hold the shores up to the OHWM in trust, notwithstanding title to
those shores were held by the riparian or littoral landowner.153
Lastly, as previously noted, the equal footing doctrine provides that land
underlying navigable waters did not pass to the state where the federal government
made a clear, pre-statehood grant or reservation of such underlying land. Such prestatehood grants or reservations must be abundantly clear, and only rarely has the
federal government actually made such a pre-statehood grant or reservation of lands
below the OHWM of navigable waters.154 Theoretically, though, if the federal
title to lands beneath navigable waters, including the Great Lakes to the international border.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312; see also Quast & Mantell, supra note 124, at 69.
150

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

151

See SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 540. Navigable waters for purposes of the navigational
servitude are defined similarly, but not identically, to navigable waters under the equal footing
doctrine. The former, sometimes referred to as navigable-in-fact, depends on whether the
waterway previously, presently, or in the future was/is/will be capable of sustaining commerce
with reasonable improvements. The latter, sometimes referred to as navigable-for-title,
depends on whether the waterway in its natural condition was capable of being used for
commerce at the time of statehood by then customary modes of transport. See JAMES
RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 832
(2004). The immunity from takings claims afforded the federal government by the
navigational servitude is similar to the takings immunity provided to states by the public trust
doctrine. Id. at 833.
152

See Gollatee v. Harrell, 731 F. Supp. 453, 461 (S.D. Ala. 1989).

153

See Huffman, Hidden Victory, supra note 103, at 10055 n.46 (“The public trust
doctrine would justify public rights in privately owned submerged lands where those lands
were previously held by the state and were alienated subject to the public trust. Thus the
public trust applies to private lands between the low and high water marks on navigable waters
because those lands were part of what the state acquired at the time of statehood.”).
154

See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 197-98 (1987); Montana
v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981). “[D]isposals by the United States during the
territorial period are not lightly to be inferred, and should not be regarded as intended unless
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government made a grant of land below the OHWM along the Great Lakes to a
private party before that state was admitted to the Union, the land subject to the
federal grant would be privately owned and title would not pass into the state’s hands
pursuant to the equal footing doctrine. Even in those circumstances, however, the
land below OHWM that the private party received via a pre-statehood federal grant
still should have been within the scope of the public trust doctrine at the time the
state was admitted to the Union. Recall that pre-statehood, the federal government
held those lands underlying navigable waters in trust, just as the crown previously
had held such lands in trust. When the federal government made its pre-statehood
grant to a private party, only the jus privatum should have been transferred; the jus
publicum should have remained with the federal government, consistent with its trust
obligation. Therefore, when the state entered the Union, the jus publicum in such
land underlying navigable waters would have passed to the state, which then
continued to hold the land in trust pursuant to the public trust doctrine, irrespective
that the state never received title to such land.155
b. The Original States
Two Great Lakes states, New York and Pennsylvania, were among the original
thirteen states, and hence they were not subject to the equal footing doctrine
applicable to newly admitted states.156 Although lands underlying navigable waters
did not pass from the federal government to the original states, it nevertheless is my
conclusion that the original states received lands underlying navigable waters,
including the Great Lakes, in trust when they became states.
As discussed above, in England at common law, the crown owned the lands
underlying navigable waters in trust for the people up to the ordinary high water
mark.157 In Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee,158 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
crown’s interests in the tidelands off New Jersey passed to the state upon the
American Revolution, thus making the state the owner in trust of the tidelands below
the ordinary high water mark. Although a few of the original states recognized title
for oceanfront landowners down to the low water mark of tidal waters, the Supreme
Court nevertheless observed that the privately owned shore between low and high
water mark was subject to the public’s use for navigation and fishing.159 That is,
although jus privatum in tidelands may have been transferred to private parties below
OHWM, the jus publicum remained with the state in trust up to OHWM.160
the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made very plain.” United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926).
155

See Hogg v. Beerman, 41 Ohio St. 81 (1884) (finding that even if there had been an
express pre-1803 grant of a parcel under Lake Erie to a private party by Connecticut that was
authorized by the federal government, the grant was subject to the public’s rights to navigate
and fish). But see Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n, 466 U.S. 198
(1984) (federal patent pursuant to treaty obligation extinguished public trust easement).
156

SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 18.

157

See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894).

158

Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).

159

Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 483-84 & n.12; Shively, 152 U.S. at 18-26.

160

See Shively, 152 U.S. at 18-26, 57; SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 70.
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The analysis becomes somewhat more complicated in the original states,
however, when focusing on non-tidal waters. In England, with few exceptions, only
tidal waters were actually navigable, and therefore tidal waters and navigable waters
were synonymous terms under English common law; accordingly, rivers above the
ebb and flow of the tides were not viewed as navigable waters and their beds were
privately owned.161 In America, some jurisdictions followed the so-called English
rule of title and did not recognize state ownership of the beds of non-tidal waters,
even though such rivers were actually navigable.162 Although Pennsylvania rejected
the so-called English rule and recognized title in the state for lands underlying
actually navigable rivers,163 New York followed the English rule in part: most
actually navigable rivers in New York were deemed non-navigable for purposes of
title, and their beds became privately owned.164 Hence, in contrast to the new states
subject to the equal footing doctrine, it is not as easy to say that the original states
received title to lands underlying all non-tidal, navigable-in-fact waters at the time of
the Revolution. Nevertheless, in both New York and Pennsylvania, the state
apparently has always owned the lands under the Great Lakes.165
Regardless of title, however, it is fair to conclude that the starting point for
purposes of the geographic boundary of the public trust doctrine along the Great
Lakes shores in New York and Pennsylvania should be the OHWM, just as it is for
the other Great Lakes states. First, the Supreme Court in Illinois Central made clear
that the limitation of navigability to tidal waters, as in England, was inapplicable to
the United States for purposes of the public trust doctrine, and hence ruled that the
Great Lakes and their underlying lands were subject to the public trust doctrine.166
Second, the Supreme Court has instructed, albeit in dicta, that just as the lands along
tidal waters are owned in trust by the states up to the high water mark, the same rule
applies to the Great Lakes, “which are treated as inland seas.”167 Third, since the
equal footing doctrine provides that the new states received lands underlying all
navigable waters up to the OHWM in order to be on equal sovereign footing with the
original states,168 it would be odd to conclude that the original states themselves did
not have the same sovereign rights and duties, including the public trust doctrine, up
to the OHWM along the Great Lakes. Fourth, as discussed in Part V below,

161

See Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454-55 (1851).

162

See Shively, 152 U.S. at 31.

163
Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810). In Pennsylvania, the state owns up to the low
water mark, but the riparian’s title between the low and high water marks is subordinate to the
public trust. See, e.g., Fulmer v. Williams, 15 A. 726 (Pa. 1888); see also infra Part V.G.
164
See Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998);
Douglaston Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201 (N.Y. 1997).
165
People ex rel. Burnham v. Jones, 20 N.E. 577 (N.Y. 1889); see also Sprague v. Nelson,
6 Pa. D. & C. 493 (Erie C.P. 1924).
166

Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435-36 (1892).

167

Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 382 (1891). The Court did not apply the same rules to
rivers. Id.
168

See supra Part IV.A.1.a.
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recognizing the public trust doctrine up to the OHWM along the Great Lakes shores
is consistent with both New York and Pennsylvania law.169
In sum, the Great Lakes states, upon admission to the Union, received at least a
jus publicum interest in the land underlying the Great Lakes up to the ordinary high
water mark in trust for the people of their states. As discussed below, however, that
is just the starting point and does not necessarily mean that the same boundary for
the public trust doctrine persists today along the Great Lakes shores.
2. Changes in the Boundary
a. By the State
Language in two important Supreme Court decisions, one from the Nineteenth
Century and one of recent vintage, arguably instructs that each state may re-define
the scope of the public trust doctrine in that state. The Shively Court, explaining why
new states admitted to the Union did not necessarily claim title to all lands
underlying navigable waters up to the OHWM, said that “[t]he title and rights of
riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below high water mark . . . are governed by
the laws of the several States, subject to the rights granted to the United States by the
Constitution.”170 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,171 the Court held that
states acquired at the time of statehood and held in public trust all land underlying
waters influenced by the tide, as well as actually navigable waters. Noting that the
original states did not uniformly claim title to all non-navigable tidal waters, the
Court in Phillips said that “it has been long established that the individual States
have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to
recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.”172
Some have read these passages as empowering states to expand the scope of the
public trust doctrine beyond lands underlying navigable waters.173 Others have
responded that such expansion of the public trust doctrine would effect an
uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the Constitution.174 Less
attention has been paid to the prospect that the language in Shively and Phillips could
authorize a state to shrink the lands subject to the public trust doctrine. Tellingly,
both Merrill and the dissent in Glass v. Goeckel, en route to opining that the
boundary of the public trust doctrine along the Great Lakes shores is the water’s
edge rather than the OHWM, cited Shively as teaching that “state law determined the
scope of the public trust in land beneath navigable waters” and “the scope of lands
subject to the public trust is determined by state law,” respectively.175
169

See infra Parts V.F and V.G.

170

Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1894).

171

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).

172

Id. at 475 (citing Shively, 152 U.S. at 26) (emphasis added).

173
See, e.g., Laura H. Kosloff, Comment, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: Is the
Public Trust Becoming Synonymous With the Public Interest?, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10200
(1988).
174

See, e.g., Huffman, Hidden Victory, supra note 103, at 10054-56.

175

Ohio ex rel. Merrill v. State of Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, Nos. 2008-L-007,
2008-L-008, 2009 WL 2591758 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2009), ¶ 77; Glass, 703 N.W.2d at
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The language of Shively and Phillips should not be read as a free ticket for a state
to draw a line anywhere it chooses as defining the limits of the public trust. For
example, what if the Illinois legislature were to define the public trust as excluding
the submerged beds of Lake Michigan in the Chicago harbor? This would allow the
legislature to evade the public trust doctrine, and the holding in Illinois Central
voiding the grant of such submerged lands to the railroad, simply by declaring
beforehand that those submerged lands were no longer subject to the public trust. By
re-defining the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine, the state effectively
would emasculate the public trust doctrine that otherwise could be—and was—used
to invalidate transfer of those same submerged lands to the railroad.
One way of reconciling the Court’s statements in Shively and Phillips with
Illinois Central is to view Shively and Phillips as speaking solely to the issues of title
and riparian or littoral rights. Both cases essentially were quiet title actions, deciding
whether title to tidelands should be in the state or in private parties.176 While both
cases discuss the public trust doctrine, the equal footing doctrine was dispositive in
both cases.177 Neither case involved a state trying to terminate the public’s rights to
use lands underlying navigable waters. Further, the quoted language from Shively
does not actually say that the state’s ability to terminate the jus publicum for lands it
holds in trust is the subject of state law; rather, it is the “title and rights of riparian or
littoral proprietors in the soil below high water mark of navigable waters” that are
governed by state laws.178 Thus, that a state may recognize title to the shore in a
private party, or recognize that the upland owner may have littoral rights such as
water access or wharfing out, would not be inconsistent with the state retaining a jus
publicum interest in the shore for use by the public.
The language in Phillips is somewhat harder to reconcile in the same manner, as
the Court expressly said that states “have the authority to define the limits of the
lands held in public trust.”179 However, the Court cited Shively for this
proposition,180 and as discussed above, Shively neither holds nor teaches that states
could shrink the lands subject to the public trust. Further, the language in Phillips is
in the midst of an explanation that not all states claim title to all lands under
tidelands and navigable waters, en route to the Court’s holding that Mississippi

87 n.12 (Markman, J., dissenting). The Glass v. Goeckel majority also cited Shively and
Phillips Petroleum, to support its conclusion that recognition of the public’s right to walk
along the shore above the water’s edge, on private property, was a matter of state law and did
not constitute a taking. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 78 n.35.
176

Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 472; Shively, 152 U.S. at 9; see also Wilkinson, supra
note 25, at 462.
177

Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 484 (tidelands at issue became property of Mississippi
upon its admission to the Union, even though not actually navigable); Shively, 152 U.S. at 5758 (tidelands at issue became property of Oregon upon its admission to the Union, and were
not subject to a pre-statehood grant by the federal government).
178

Shively, 152 U.S. at 40 (emphasis added).

179

Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 475.

180

Id.
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acquired title to lands underlying non-navigable tidal waters pursuant to the equal
footing doctrine.181
But a corollary to such a reconciliation would be that the states only have power
to transfer jus privatum and that the public’s right to use the shore could never be
abrogated; once a state acquires land underlying navigable waters in trust, it must
always maintain that land for the uses protected by the public trust doctrine. That is,
forever into the future, every inch of the shore must be kept open to the public for
protected uses such as navigation, fishing, and commerce. Future changes in uses of
the shores that may be beneficial to the public—say, using a portion of the shore to
construct a public aquarium—would be foreclosed, because the change would render
a portion of the shore no longer available for navigation, fishing, and commerce by
the public. Use of the shores would become ossified, ultimately to the public’s
detriment.182
A closer look at Illinois Central, however, reveals another way of reconciling its
teachings with the language of Shively and Phillips. In short, states have some
ability to re-define the limits of the lands subject to the public trust, but their ability
to do so is circumscribed by the public trust doctrine itself.
The Court in Illinois Central did not flatly prohibit sale of lands underlying
navigable waters to private parties. On the contrary, the Court recognized that states
may lawfully, and consistent with the public trust, grant parcels of submerged land to
private parties.183 This, of course, is consistent with the concepts of jus privatum and
jus publicum under the public trust doctrine. Title may be transferred to a private
party, but the private party’s rights in the property are subordinate to the public rights
to use the property protected by the public trust doctrine.184 Put another way, a
transfer of an underlying parcel to a private party that does not impair the public’s
rights to engage in protected uses of that parcel is appropriate under the public trust
doctrine.
What the Court found objectionable as violating the public trust in Illinois
Central was the state’s transfer to the railroad of such a vast swath of Lake Michigan
181

Id. at 475-76.

182

See Sax, supra note 6, at 477 (criticizing such a view of the public trust doctrine as
rendering lands unchangeable in use and extraordinarily restraining government in ways
neither Roman nor English law ever contemplated).
One might argue that different uses of the shore in the future could be allowed, consistent
with this view of the public trust doctrine, simply by enlarging the types of uses protected by
the doctrine. There is a difference, however, between a use protected by the public trust
doctrine and a use permitted by the public trust doctrine. The former requires the state to
maintain the public’s right to use the land for that protected use; the latter allows the state to
use (or transfer) the land for some purpose despite adverse impact on the public’s right to use
the land. Using the example above, recognizing an aquarium as a protected use would mean
that the state must allow the public to build an aquarium on the land. This is different from
saying that an aquarium is a permissible public purpose and thus the state could allow building
an aquarium on underlying land without violating the public trust doctrine.
183

Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435, 452-56 (1892).

184

The Illinois Central Court quoted Hale’s De Jure Maris regarding the concepts of jus
privatum and jus publicum, and stated that lands underlying navigable waters could be
transferred subject to the public trust. Id. at 458.
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beds under terms that rendered virtually the entire Chicago harbor no longer
available for use by the public for navigation, fishing, and commerce.185 The Illinois
Central Court signaled, however, that an alienation of lands underlying navigable
waters under certain circumstances would not run afoul of the public trust doctrine,
even though it resulted in an impairment of the public’s rights to use such lands.
First, the Court gave examples of grants of submerged parcels that did not violate
the public trust: “grants of parcels of lands under navigable waters that may afford
foundation for wharves, piers, docks, and other structures in aid of commerce, and
grants of parcels which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the public
interest in the lands and waters remaining.”186 Second, after articulating the general
rule that the state has an obligation to preserve navigable waters and their underlying
lands for use by the public and that the state’s control over such lands cannot be
relinquished by a transfer of the property, the Court specifically recognized
exceptions to that general rule: “The control of the state for the purposes of the trust
can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of
the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the
public interest in the lands and waters remaining.”187
The Supreme Court subsequently has not further specified the circumstances by
which a state, consistent with the public trust doctrine, could lawfully transfer or
otherwise alienate land underlying navigable waters in a manner that would impair
or terminate the public’s right to use such lands and waters. It is fair to say that
commentators and lower courts have been less than uniform in determining what
constitutes such acceptable circumstances.188 Based on the core principles of the
public trust doctrine, drawn from the teachings of Illinois Central and other cases, I
propose that the public’s right to engage in uses protected by the public trust doctrine

185

Id. at 454-56. The planned use by the railroad of the granted submerged lands
presumably would have substantially interfered with the public’s continued ability to use the
waters and lands of Chicago harbor for navigation, fishing, and commerce.
186

Id. at 452 (emphasis added).

187

Id. at 453 (emphases added). The Court subsequently repeated the same exceptions:
The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely
under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of parcels
mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when
parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains . .
..
Id.
188
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 28, at 426 (transfer of public property to private party
requires compensation to the public); Rasband, supra note 10, at 85 (as long as legislative
intent is clear); Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 461-62 (if the transfer advances navigation or
does not substantially impair the public’s rights to engage in protected uses). Professor Sax, in
an oft-quoted passage, generally outlined the circumstances as follows:
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general public,
a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which
is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject
public uses to the self-interest of private parties.
Sax, supra note 6, at 490.
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on a parcel underlying the Great Lakes should be permitted to be impaired or
terminated only under the following circumstances:
(1) The legislature’s intent to impair or terminate the public’s right to use the
land must be clear. There is a longstanding presumption that a transfer of the jus
privatum interest in land will not affect the public’s right to continue to use that
land.189 This presumption is well grounded in the importance of the public’s rights to
use such land and associated navigable waters. Hence, the legislature’s intent to
overcome that well-founded presumption, and impair or terminate the public’s right
to continue making protected uses of such land, must be clear.190
(2) The impairment of public use must not be substantial. The state has a trust
obligation to preserve the navigable waters and underlying lands for certain protected
public uses, and allowing substantial impairment of those public rights would breach
that trust.191 Whether the impairment is substantial should involve weighing at least
two considerations. First, the amount of land impaired or relinquished must not be
substantial. Only relatively small parcels of underlying lands can be relinquished
from protected public use without substantially impairing the rights of the public to
engage in protected uses.192 Second, the effect of the impairment or termination must
not be substantial. In some situations, the termination of even relatively small
parcels from the geographic scope of the public trust may substantially impair the
public’s rights, either due to the importance of that parcel to such rights or the effect
it has on the public’s rights to engage in protected uses of the remaining waters and
lands.
(3) The impairment must advance an important public interest. The public is the
beneficiary of the public trust; an impairment of the public’s rights guaranteed by the
public trust doctrine should only be permitted where it is in the public interest to do
so.193 There is a split of authority regarding whether the public interests justifying
impairment of the public’s rights to use underlying land are limited to those which
advance uses protected by the public trust doctrine or include a broader category of
public interests.194 On one hand, limiting the public interests to those advancing uses
protected by the public trust doctrine would, as mentioned above, tend toward
ossification of the shores. On the other hand, allowing impairment or termination of
the public’s rights to make protected uses of underlying lands merely because a
legislature or judge deems it to be in the public interest could eviscerate the public
trust doctrine. For example, the public trust doctrine under this view might allow a
state to relinquish the important public rights protected by the doctrine in return for

189
See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 (1842) (A grant of an
exclusive fishery will not be presumed “unless clear and especial words are used to denote
it.”).
190

Where the action is taken by a state agency, the delegation of its authority to take such
action likewise must be clear. See Lazarus, supra note 16, at 654.
191

Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452-56.

192

See id. at 452 (wharves, docks, and piers).

193

Id. at 453-56.

194

See SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 232-33; Lazarus, supra note 16, at 651-53.
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short-term economic benefits (e.g., increased tax revenue, more jobs) that arguably
serve a public interest.195
A better view is that the proposed alienation can be for an important public
purpose beyond protected uses, but it must primarily benefit the public and relate to
its location on land underlying navigable waters. In general, an alienation that
primarily benefits a private party, or excludes the public from the land, is not
advancing an important public purpose.196 For instance, transferring land to lure a
new business to the region may have public benefits, such as increased employment
opportunities for local residents and enhanced tax revenue, but the primary
beneficiary of the transfer is the private business, not the public.197 Similarly,
building a prison may be important to the state, but a prison could be built virtually
anywhere. It need not be built adjacent to navigable waters and thus lacks the
requisite nexus to its location on the underlying land.198
In sum, a state does have some authority to redefine the geographic scope of the
lands held in public trust, as Shively and Phillips suggest. But as Illinois Central
teaches, the state’s ability to do so is circumscribed by the parameters of the public
trust doctrine itself. A state should only be permitted to relinquish lands from the
scope of the protections afforded by the public trust doctrine where the legislature’s
intent to do so is clear, where the public’s rights to engage in uses protected by the
public trust doctrine are not substantially impaired, and where an important public
interest is promoted.199
195

See Sax, supra note 6, at 477.
[I]f the trust in American law implies nothing more than that state authority must be
exercised consistent with the general police power, then the trust imposes no restraint
on government beyond that which is implicit in all judicial review of state action—the
challenged conduct, to be valid, must be exercised for a public purpose and must not
merely be a gift of public property for a strictly private purpose.
Id.; see also SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 233.
196

Sax, supra note 6, at 490.
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general public,
a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which
is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject
public uses to the self-interest of private parties.
Id.
197

See People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1976). A narrow
exception could be recognized, however, for private wharves, piers, docks, and similar
structures advancing navigation and commerce. See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452.
198
See SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 233 (“[A] conveyance of trust lands should be
related to the lands and waters remaining, not simply any interest that would further the
general common good of the public.”).

To avoid permanently relinquishing land from the scope of the public trust, a state could
choose to lease the land to the private party. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.11 (West
2009) (authorizing the director of natural resources to lease lands underlying Lake Erie).
Alternatively, a state could impose a requirement that the land, or at least the jus publicum,
revert to the state once the proposed use deemed to be in the public interest ceases.
199

SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 231-35 (suggesting similar criteria for limiting a state’s
power to convey the jus publicum in public trust lands); but cf. id. at 240-42 (suggesting
different criteria for terminating the public interest).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010

33

34

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1

Importantly, it should be noted that, consistent with the public trust doctrine, a
state could redefine “ordinary high water mark” rather than continue to follow the
common law definition. For example, a state could redefine OHWM, via legislation
or authorized regulation, to establish a “brighter line” boundary for the public trust
along the shore—i.e., one more readily identifiable or ascertainable by the public,
littoral owners, and the state.200 Examples could include redefining OHWM as a
specific elevation above sea level or as a particular horizontal distance from the
water’s edge.
In redefining the scope of the public trust doctrine, though, the state remains
bound by the restrictions of the public trust doctrine itself, outlined above.
Legislatively redefining the boundary of the public trust doctrine to make it more
readily ascertainable could be viewed as promoting an important public interest,
because doing so would facilitate public use of the lands and the state’s obligation to
protect such lands. As long as the amount of lands and waters subject to the public
trust would not be substantially diminished, and the public’s rights to make use of
the lands and waters would not be substantially impaired, the fact that in certain
areas the new public trust boundary might be set more lakeward than at common law
should not prevent the state from legislatively redefining the boundary.201

200

One of the dissent’s key criticisms of the majority opinion in Glass v. Goeckel was that
the water’s edge is a more readily identifiable boundary than the common law OHWM, which
“requires littoral property owners and the public to guess” its location. Glass v. Goeckel, 703
N.W.2d 58, 102-03 (Mich. 2005) (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Similarly, the Merrill court asserted that “[t]he water’s edge provides a readily discernible
boundary for both the public and littoral landowners.” State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dept. of
Natural Res., Nos. 2008-L-007, 2008-L-008, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 128 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
21, 2009).
201
The public trust doctrine also serves to restrict the state’s ability to expand its
geographic scope. For example, setting the boundary of the public trust doctrine ten miles
more landward than at common law would be an unreasonable, unlawful interpretation of
OHWM. Such a government action would not be protected by the public trust doctrine from a
takings claim.

A number of states, including Ohio, have recognized the public’s right to recreationally
boat on streams that are not navigable-for-title: that is, streams that were not actually
navigable for commercial purposes at the time of the state’s admission to the Union. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Schaeffer, 126 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio 1955); State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete
Co., 336 N.E.2d 453 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). Typically, the beds of non-navigable streams are
privately owned and not subject to the public trust doctrine; the riparian owners can exclude
the public from access to such non-navigable waters and underlying private lands. See, e.g.,
East Bay Sporting Club v. Miller, 161 N.E. 12 (Ohio 1928). Some have criticized the
recognition of the public right to recreationally boat in waters that are not navigable-for-title as
an unlawful expansion of the public trust doctrine and a taking of private property without just
compensation. See, e.g., Huffman, Hidden Victory, supra note 103, at 10055-56. On the other
hand, it could be argued that such an “expansion” to include streams capable of floating a
canoe or kayak is in fact a lawful, reasonable re-definition of the term “navigable” for
purposes of the public trust doctrine. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in an important
takings case, background principles of state law can evolve. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (“[C]hanged circumstances or new knowledge may make what
was previously permissible no longer so.”). The Great Lakes unquestionably are navigablefor-title.
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Yet if the state legislature impairs or terminates the jus publicum for a vast swath
of lands, whether via express legislation or under the guise of redefinition, what will
empower a court to invalidate the legislative act? This question, of course, has
vexed courts and commentators ever since the Illinois Central Court voided the
legislature’s grant of Lake Michigan beds to the railroad more than a century ago.
Although the Supreme Court subsequently described Illinois Central as being
grounded in state law,202 some have argued that the public trust doctrine is rooted in
the U.S. Constitution.203 Others view the public trust doctrine as a unique species of
common law, one that cannot be undone by state legislation.204 Today regarding the
Great Lakes shores, however, arguably the question is more easily answered.
Virtually all of the Great Lakes states have constitutional provisions pursuant to
which courts could base decisions to invalidate legislative acts that violate the public
trust doctrine.205 Some states have specific constitutional provisions aimed at
protecting natural resources or the environment.206 Other state constitutions repeat
language from the Northwest Ordinance providing that the Great Lakes and certain
other navigable waters shall be “common highways and forever free.”207 In Ohio, a
recent constitutional amendment specifically recognizes the public trust doctrine as it
applies to Lake Erie and navigable waters of the state.208 Hence, there should be no
doubt about a court’s power to void state actions that violate the public trust doctrine
with respect to the shores of the Great Lakes.
b. Physical Changes to the Shore
Like the boundary for title purposes,209 the common law boundary of the public
trust doctrine along the Great Lakes shore is a movable freehold. That is, the
OHWM is not forever fixed as of the date of statehood. Rather, the OHWM may
move lakeward due to accretion and lower lake levels and may move landward due
to erosion and higher lake levels. This ambulatory boundary ensures that the public

202

Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926).

203

See Epstein, supra note 28, at 427-28 (equal protection and due process clauses);
Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 459 (commerce clause).
204
See David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the
Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 715 (2008).
205

See Araiza, supra note 28, at 438-51; Klass, supra note 6, at 719, 728-30; see also
Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)
(legislation relinquishing Arizona’s interests in navigable riverbeds held invalid under the
common law public trust doctrine and so-called gift clause of the state constitution).
206

ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52; N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 27.
207
“The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying
places between the same, shall be common highways and forever free . . . .” Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, art. IV, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789). For state constitutions embodying such
language, see MINN. CONST. art. II, § 2; WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
208

OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19(B).

209

See supra Part II.
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retains the rights to use the waters and shores of the Great Lakes, and the littoral
owner retains her littoral rights, regardless of physical changes to the shore.210
Sudden avulsive changes to the shore, however, should not result in loss of public
trust lands. Neither should artificial changes (e.g., filling submerged lands) deprive
the public of the right to use lands protected by the public trust.211
B. Protected Public Uses
Not every use of public trust waters and lands is protected by the public trust
doctrine. The Supreme Court in Illinois Central instructed that the State of Illinois
held the waters of Lake Michigan and the underlying land in trust for the public to
use for navigation, fishing, and commerce.212 Subsequently, navigation, fishing, and
commerce have come to be viewed as the traditional triad of public trust protected
uses.213 Some courts have limited protected uses to the traditional triad and uses
“incidental” to one or more of these triad of uses. That is, uses incidental to
navigation, fishing, or commerce are afforded public trust protection, but those that
are not incidental to one of the triad are not subject to the public trust.214
But in many jurisdictions uses beyond—and not necessarily incidental to—the
traditional triad have long been recognized as subject to the protection of the public
trust doctrine. Protected uses long recognized by various courts include bathing,
hunting, ice cutting, and skating.215 In Phillips, the Supreme Court noted that even
where tidelands are privately owned, “public rights to use the tidelands for the

210

See Abrams, supra note 35, at 898-902.

211

See SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 108-17. Changes in legal status of the shore due to
adverse possession, prescription, or similar state law principles of property law are beyond the
scope of this Article. In general, however, in most states a private party cannot gain title to
state-owned land via adverse possession or acquire rights to use state-owned lands via
prescription. Even where adverse possession or prescription is recognized against the state,
the dominant jus publicum interest should not be extinguished. Id. at 238-40; see also Oregon
ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969) (common law doctrine of custom allows
public to obtain easement for recreational use of privately owned dry sand ocean beach).
212

Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).

213

See, e.g., SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 170-71. At least one commentator has
disputed that the jus publicum under English common law preserved any public right beyond
navigation. See Deveney, supra note 11, at 46-48. The Nineteenth Century Supreme Court,
however, clearly viewed the public trust doctrine in England as protecting fishing as well as
navigation and commerce. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894). As the Twentieth
Century Supreme Court noted in a related context, “[W]e do not intend to get involved in the
historical debate over what the English common law was . . . . [O]ur concern is with how that
law was understood and applied by this Court in its cases.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 478 n.7 (1988).
214

See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (public’s rights to use privately
owned tidelands are limited to fishing, fowling, and navigation, or uses incidental thereto, and
do not include general recreational uses).
215

See, e.g., Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 54 (Mich. 1926) (hunting); Lamprey v.
Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893) (bathing, skating, ice cutting, etc.).
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purposes of fishing, hunting, bathing, etc., have long been recognized,” terming them
“traditional privileges.”216
Recent decades have seen an increase in the types of uses protected by the public
trust doctrine in multiple jurisdictions, including the Great Lakes states. For
example, recreational boating is now recognized as a protected use in many states.217
A number of states have employed the public trust doctrine to preserve the scenic,
ecological, and environmental values of the waters and lands within the geographic
scope of the public trust.218 Some have criticized this “expansion,” urging that
forcing private owners to allow “new” uses of their property by the public constitutes
a physical or regulatory taking of private property without just compensation.219 As
reflected above, however, protected public trust uses clearly need not be limited to
navigation, fishing, and commerce. That triad became protected uses under the
public trust doctrine because they were the uses of navigable waters important to the
public during past centuries. The public trust doctrine is a dynamic doctrine that
should be able to evolve to protect uses of navigable waters and underlying lands
that are important for the public today.220
But just as clearly, there must be some limit on the types of public uses protected
by the public trust doctrine. Merely because the land geographically is subject to the
public trust should not mean that members of the public have an enforceable right to
make whatever use they want of such land, over the objections of the state or private
landowner. Should there be a public right, for example, to use the privately owned
shore to play beach volleyball?
While public trust protected uses need not be static, the scope of protected uses
should be true to the principles of the public trust doctrine. The public trust doctrine
balances the need to keep certain lands and waters available for important common
uses with the rights of the property owner, state or private, to make use of its
property.221 Just as completely excluding the public from use of such lands and

216

Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 483 n.12.

217

See, e.g., Lamprey, 53 N.W.1139; Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706
N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998); Coleman v. Schaeffer, 126 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio 1955); Muench v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952).
218
See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (environmental and
ecological values); Muench, 53 N.W.2d 514, 522 (scenic beauty).
219

See, e.g., Huffman, Takings Clause, supra note 33.

220

See Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (“The public uses to which tidelands are subject are
sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs.”); cf. Ohio ex rel. Squire v. City of
Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 730 (Ohio 1948) (refusing to allow “dead hand of the past” to limit
public trust doctrine, explaining that “the law should be flexible enough to be applied to a
constantly progressive civilization”).
221
See Thompson, supra note 7, at 59-60 (arguing that “[t]he public trust doctrine at its
core opposes excess” and noting that most major public trust opinions balance the value of
private property with the protection of public resources).
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waters would violate the public trust, the balance likewise is violated by opening
those lands and waters to any and all public uses.222
Accordingly, to allow states to preserve the balance between evolving public
needs and the needs of the landowner, I propose the following framework for
evaluating whether a use should be protected by the public trust doctrine: In addition
to navigation, fishing, and commerce, and uses incidental thereto, protected uses (a)
should be sufficiently important as to justify public trust protection, with a nexus to
the public trust lands or waters, and (b) should not substantially interfere with the
property rights of the owner in ways beyond what would result from the exercise of
protected uses already recognized.223 For example, the erection of housing for low
income persons may be important, but it should not be a protected use because lowincome housing could be located anywhere and such permanent structures would
cause substantial additional interference with the rights of the littoral owner,
including her right to access the lake and to use her shore. Playing beach volleyball
should not be sufficiently important to the public as to justify public trust protection.
Walking along the shore of the Great Lakes, between the ordinary high water
mark and the water’s edge, could easily qualify as a protected public trust use. First,
walking can be considered incidental to protected uses such as navigation or
fishing.224 Second, walking the shore of the Great Lakes is important, bears a close
nexus to the protected lands and waters, and does not substantially interfere with the
rights of the littoral owner in ways beyond what results from protected uses now.
Many courts have long recognized that walking along the ocean shore between the

222
To the extent that a use is consistent with the public trust doctrine, recognition of the
public’s right to engage in such use on private property, which is subject to the jus publicum,
should not constitute a taking. See supra Part II.
223

These factors faintly echo criteria relevant to regulatory takings. See Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (recognizing import of restrictions that background
principles of state law already place upon the land); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104 (1978) (balancing magnitude of economic impact of regulation, degree of
interference with investment-backed expectations, and character and purpose of government
regulation). But the factors I propose are tailored to the unique setting of lands within the
geographic scope of the public trust doctrine.
As Professor Sax has opined, “The central idea of the public trust is preventing the
destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common but without formal recognition
such as title. The function of the public trust as a legal doctrine is to protect such public
expectations against destabilizing changes . . . .” Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust
Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 188 (1980) (footnote
omitted).
224
In Glass v. Goeckel, both the majority and dissenting justices agreed that walking along
the shore was a protected use under the public trust doctrine; the only dispute was whether the
public had a right to walk above the water’s edge, as even the dissenting opinions
acknowledged the public’s right to walk at or below the water’s edge. Glass v. Goeckel, 703
N.W.2d 58, 62, 73-74 (Mich. 2005); id. at 85 n.10 (Markman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting). Similarly, the Merrill court recognized that walking was a protected use, albeit
lakeward of the water’s edge. Ohio ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Res., Nos. 2008L-007, 2008-L-008, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 89 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2009). But see Bell v.
Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 175 (Me. 1989) (walking is not incidental to fishing, fowling,
or navigation).
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ordinary high water mark and the water’s edge is a protected use under the public
trust doctrine.225 A concomitant right to walk along the shores of our “inland seas” is
just as important and should be protected by the public trust doctrine as well.
Although walking can be done almost anywhere, walking along the Great Lakes
shore offers unparalleled and unique opportunities to enjoy and experience the Great
Lakes waters and shore that cannot be replicated by walking elsewhere.226 Lastly,
walking along the Great Lakes shore does not permanently or unreasonably interfere
with the private rights of the littoral owner. Persons walking slightly above the
water’s edge would pose little or no more interference with the owner’s use of the
shore property, or her littoral rights, than would persons fishing or boating a few feet
below the water’s edge.227
V. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO THE GREAT LAKES SHORES
This part begins by showing that application of my proposed framework
regarding the public’s right to walk the Great Lakes shores would reach the same
result in Michigan as did Glass v. Goeckel, albeit by somewhat different means,
while in Ohio both the means and end would differ from that of the court in Merrill
v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources. This part then discusses the remaining
Great Lakes states. No reported decision in any other Great Lakes state appears to
have squarely addressed the public’s right to walk along the shores of the Great
Lakes. Most states, however, have a fairly well developed public trust doctrine by
virtue of case law and, in some instances, statutory and constitutional provisions.
Utilization of my framework would be consistent with, or at least not inconsistent
with, existing public trust doctrine in these other Great Lakes states and would, I
submit, bring a principled approach and salutary results to questions regarding the
public’s right to use the Great Lakes shores.

225

See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821) (public right to pass and re-pass
along the shore); Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 85 N.E. 1093, 1097 (N.Y. 1908)
(public right to pass along the shore between low and high water marks); Caminiti v. Boyle,
732 P.2d 989, 996 (Wash. 1987) (recognizing that landowners’ docks cannot interfere with the
public right to pass along the shore); SLADE ET AL., supra note 5, at 210 (“In nearly all States
the Public Trust Doctrine provides the public a right to pass and repass over public trust
tidelands.”). But see Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (statute providing for
the public right to use shore up to high water mark for recreation declared unconstitutional
taking); Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974) (declaring unconstitutional a
bill that included public right to pass along shore between high and low water lines).
While “lateral” access along the ocean shores is widely protected by the public trust
doctrine, a right of “perpendicular” access—i.e., walking perpendicularly to the ocean across
private property—is seldom protected by the public trust doctrine. See SLADE ET AL., supra
note 5, at 210.
226

See Abrams, supra note 35, at 861-63 & n.6.

227

See Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 89 (“[T]he public does not interfere with littoral
property rights when their recognized, individual rights are exercised within the public trust;
that is, lakeward of the shoreline as defined herein.”). The public’s right to walk along the
shore, like all uses protected by the public trust doctrine, is not unfettered and is subject to
regulation. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 75.
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A. Michigan
The Glass v. Goeckel majority opinion in many ways followed the analytical
framework this Article proposes. The Michigan Supreme Court examined the
public’s right to walk along the shore of the Great Lakes by evaluating both the
public trust doctrine’s geographic scope and the uses it protects.228 The majority
concluded that the geographic reach of the public trust doctrine for the Great Lakes
in Michigan extended to the ordinary high water mark and adopted the common law
definition of OHWM.229 Although Michigan common law had not defined the
OHWM, the Glass v. Goeckel court looked to Wisconsin case law to hold that the
OHWM is defined as the point on the shore where the presence and action of the
water has left a distinct mark.230 The majority adopted the distinction between jus
privatum and jus publicum, recognizing that the public trust doctrine can extend to
privately owned land acquired from the sovereign.231
However, the majority did not expressly look to the equal footing doctrine in
determining the starting point for the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine.232
Rather, it looked to earlier Michigan case law and analogized to ocean precedents
that indicated the public trust should extend to lands submerged on a regular basis.233
While the grounds relied upon by the Michigan Supreme Court were neither
incorrect nor unpersuasive, earlier Michigan case law was not directly on point and
some would argue, as the dissenting justices did, that ocean shores subject to the
tides are an imperfect analogy to the Great Lakes shores because of the irregular
nature of lake level fluctuations.234 Per my proposed framework, a court would have
reasoned as follows: As a matter of federal law, lands underlying the Great Lakes up
to the ordinary high water mark passed to Michigan in trust when it joined the
Union, in accordance with the equal footing doctrine; while the state may have
relinquished title below the OHWM to private parties, the state did not relinquish
228

Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 66-75.

229

Id. at 69-73.

230

Id. at 72 (quoting Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914)
(defining OHWM for a river)). The majority also pointed to R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin,
628 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2001), and Wisconsin v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. 1987), in
which the Wisconsin Supreme Court defined OHWM for Lake Superior. Id. The majority did
not address Doemel v. Jantz, 193 N.W. 393 (Wis. 1923), in which the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that the public did not have a right to walk along the shore of a smaller, navigable
inland lake above the water’s edge, even though the state owned up to the OHWM. The
dissent criticized the majority for “adopt[ing] only a part of the law of that other state, again
without much explanation as to why it has chosen to adopt only parts of that other state’s law.”
Id. at 96 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
231

Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 65-66.

232

The court did note that “when the state (or entities that predated our state’s admission
to the Union) conveyed littoral property to private parties, that property remained subject to
the public trust.” Id. at 62.
233

Id. at 68-71.

234

Id. at 100 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting) (“[W]hile the ‘ordinary high
water mark’ makes sense in tidal waters, it does not make sense in the nontidal Great Lakes
because of the irregular nature of lake level fluctuations.”).
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any portion of the shore below OHWM from the scope of the public trust doctrine;
and therefore the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine remains at the
common law OHWM.235
The Glass v. Goeckel court rejected the argument, voiced by the plaintiff, that the
Michigan Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act236 had legislatively defined the
landward boundary of the public trust doctrine. The statute describes various
regulatory authorities of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality for
lands owned or held in trust by the state lakeward of the natural ordinary high water
mark of the Great Lakes, with each lake’s ordinary high water mark defined as a
specific elevation above sea level.237 As discussed in Part IV.A.1 above, a state does
have the power to redefine the geographic boundary of the public trust doctrine, at
least to some extent. Here, however, it appears the Michigan Supreme Court
correctly determined that the legislature had not clearly intended to redefine the
boundaries of the public trust pursuant to the Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act.238
As the dissenting justices in Glass v. Goeckel legitimately point out, the common
law ordinary high water mark is not always readily visible or easily determined.239
Rocky shores, for example, may bear no distinct mark. Unlike ocean shores where
twice a day the tides cover the shore to approximately the same point, the levels of
the Great Lakes vary seasonally within the year, from year to year, and even decade
to decade. Annually, the water levels in the lakes are usually highest during the
summer and lowest during the winter. But due to a variety of factors, the average
lake levels may vary from one year to the next by a foot or more, and it is not
uncommon for average lake levels to remain, compared to normal, relatively high or
low for several years in a row.240 Thus, it is more difficult to ascertain at what point
the water’s presence is sufficiently continuous. Setting the boundary at the water’s
235

In Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159 (Mich. 1930), the Michigan Supreme Court, reversing
prior precedent, held that the state did not own shore between the meander line and the water’s
edge, but rather the private owner held title to the water’s edge. Id. at 230-31. As a result, in
that case the private owner was entitled to land formed through reliction as a riparian right.
The Hilt case did not establish the boundary of the public trust doctrine as the water’s edge.
To the extent Hilt indicated that upon admission to the Union, only land below the water’s
edge passed to Michigan as a matter of federal law, I respectfully contend that the court was in
error. More accurately, as described in Part IV.A.1 supra, the state received land up to the
OHWM as a matter of federal law under the equal footing doctrine, but as a matter of state
law, Michigan chose to recognize title in the state only up to the water’s edge.
236

MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.32501-324.32516 (2009).

237
Using International Great Lakes Datum of 1955, the statute sets OHWM for Lake
Superior, 601.5 feet; Lakes Michigan and Huron, 579.8 feet; Lake St. Clair, 574.7 feet; and
Lake Erie, 571.6 feet. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.32502 (2009).
238

Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 67-68.

239

Id. at 102-03 & n.47 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

240

See NOAA GREAT LAKES ENVTL. RESEARCH LAB., MONTHLY BULLETIN OF LAKE
LEVELS FOR THE GREAT LAKES (Jan. 2009); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & GREAT LAKES
COMM’N, LIVING WITH THE LAKES 16-18 (1999). For example, water levels for Lakes
Michigan and Huron reached record highs in 1986. During this decade, lake levels dropped
through 2007 to near record lows, but they have been climbing the past two years. NOAA,
supra.
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edge does have the virtue of a bright-line rule, readily ascertainable by the public,
littoral landowners and the state. But it is important to realize that the advantages of
such a bright-line boundary come at a high cost: the protection of the Great Lakes
shores and the public’s rights to use them. The state, of course, could still regulate
the littoral owner’s use of the shore above the water’s edge pursuant to its police
powers. In the absence of the public trust, however, the public has no right to use
the privately owned shores. Perhaps even more importantly, the state has no duty to
regulate private use of the shores pursuant to its police powers, and without the
public trust doctrine, the public is left with little recourse where the state fails to
protect the shores from private or state actions. If a state considers the common law
OHWM too indefinite, it can redefine OHWM, subject to the constraints of the
public trust doctrine, to establish a brighter-line boundary that would still protect the
shores and guarantee the public’s right to use them (e.g., ten yards horizontally from
the water’s edge, specific elevation above sea level which could be adjusted every
few years based on recent data).241
With respect to uses protected by the public trust, the Glass v. Goeckel majority
determined that walking was a protected use, primarily because it is necessary to
walk in order to engage in traditional protected uses such as fishing, hunting, and
boating for pleasure or commerce.242 Although the dissent limited the geographic
scope of the public trust doctrine to the water’s edge, the dissent likewise agreed that
walking was a protected use, if done below the water’s edge.243 The court, however,
punted on providing guidance for what uses are protected, merely offering a caveat
that not every use of public trust lands is protected and there is not an unlimited right
of access to private land below the OHWM.244 As discussed in Part IV.B above,
additional uses would be protected under my framework if they are important to
society, closely related to the protected waters and lands, and do not substantially
interfere with the rights of the littoral owner in ways beyond what previously
recognized protected uses do.
B. Ohio
The approach of the Ohio court of appeals in Merrill v. Ohio Department of
Natural Resources in determining the scope of the public trust doctrine along the
Ohio shores of Lake Erie differed from that of the Michigan Supreme Court, as did
its result. Ohio long has recognized that the state owns the waters and beds of Lake
Erie in trust for its people to use for navigation, fishing, and commerce.245 Ohio
241

See supra Part IV.A.2.

242

Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 73-75. The majority noted that Michigan case law had
recognized that ice cutting and log floating were uses protected by the public trust doctrine,
too. Id. at 74 n.25. Such uses are not necessary to engage in navigation, commerce, or
fishing, so some other criteria are needed to explain why they are protected by the public trust
doctrine.
243
Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 100-01 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The parties did not contest that walking was a protected use under the public trust doctrine.
Id. at 73-74 (majority opinion).
244

Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 75.

245

See Ohio ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1948); Winous Point
Shooting Club v. Slaughterbeck, 117 N.E. 162 (Ohio 1917); State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh
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courts previously, however, had not expressly ruled on the location of the landward
boundary of the public trust along the Lake Erie shore nor on whether walking the
shore is a protected use.
Geographically, the Merrill court essentially equated the scope of the public trust
doctrine with the lands owned in fee by the state. That is, according to the court of
appeals, the landward boundary of the public trust doctrine along the Lake Erie shore
is the same as the title boundary dividing the state-owned lakebed from the privately
owned uplands.246 No distinction was made between jus privatum and jus publicum
interests.
The Merrill court specifically rejected the view that the geographic scope of the
public trust doctrine was or is linked to the equal footing doctrine or federal law.247
R.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677 (Ohio 1916); Sloan v. Biemiller, 34 Ohio St. 492 (1878); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (West 2009).
246
Ohio ex rel. Merrill v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., Nos. 2008-L-007, 2008-L008, 2009
WL 2591758, ¶¶ 1, 2, 6, 127-29 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2009). Perhaps this focus was the
result of the state’s claim to own up to the OHWM, so that it could require littoral owners to
lease land below OHWM if they wanted to wharf out, id. ¶ 2, and of the landowners’ claims
that their ownership extended to the water’s edge or to the low water mark. Id. ¶¶ 50-52, 9495. The trial court noted, “The parties also appear to agree that, whatever the proper boundary
is between the public trust territory and the title rights of littoral landowners, that boundary is
always coterminous and never overlaps.” Merrill, 2007 WL 491086, ¶ 16 n.9.
247

Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶¶ 75-82. Intervenors National Wildlife Federation and
Ohio Environmental Council argued that, as a matter of federal law, the landward boundary of
the public trust along the Lake Erie shore in Ohio must be the ordinary high water mark. See
id. ¶ 76. While my framework provides that the starting point for determining the geographic
scope of the public trust doctrine along the Ohio shore of Lake Erie is the OHWM as a matter
of federal law by virtue of the equal footing doctrine, I do not concur that federal law
mandates that the OHWM is the landward boundary for the public trust today along the Lake
Erie shore. See supra Part IV.2.
The common pleas court in Merrill asserted another reason for finding the equal footing
doctrine irrelevant to the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine or the dividing line
between public and private title along the Lake Erie shore. The trial court reasoned that much
of the land along Lake Erie did not pass from the federal government to Ohio upon its
statehood in 1803, because such lands were previously subject to conflicting claims by
Connecticut, Virginia, and New York. Merrill, 2007 WL 4910860, ¶ 235. The trial court’s
reasoning, however, seemingly misconstrued the effects of both the equal footing doctrine, by
which title to lands underlying navigable waters pass to new states absent a grant or
reservation by the federal government, see, e.g., Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States,
482 U.S. 193, 195-98 (1987), and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, by which the original
states relinquished their claims to lands in the Northwest territories, including Ohio, to the
federal government. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch.8, 1 Stat. 50-53 (1789); Rasband,
supra note 10, at 30-34. As a result, unless the federal government had expressly authorized
grants to private parties by the original colonies of lands underlying Lake Erie prior to 1803,
those lands should have passed to the State of Ohio upon its admission to the Union. See
supra Part IV.A.1.a.
Moreover, the lands underlying navigable waters were subject to the public trust doctrine
when the original colonies acquired them from the crown. That is, just as the crown and
federal government retained jus publicum in such lands when jus privatum was transferred to a
private party, the original colonies likewise would retain jus publicum if jus privatum were
transferred to a private party prior to Ohio becoming a state. Hence, the jus publicum would
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Rather, the court invoked Shively to assert that state law determines the scope of the
public trust in land underlying navigable waters such as Lake Erie.248
The court of appeals then proceeded to try to divine what Ohio law says about the
scope of the public trust doctrine along the Lake Erie shore. Relying primarily on
language from a few Ohio Supreme Court decisions and the term “natural shoreline”
in Ohio Revised Code sections 1506.10 and .11,249 the court concluded that state law
sets the landward boundary of the public trust doctrine along the Lake Erie shore at
the water’s edge.250 Rejecting the defendants’ argument that the public trust extends
to the OHWM, the Merrill court stated that the public trust doctrine “cannot be
improperly extended in violation of littoral property owners’ rights.”251
I respectfully submit that the Ohio court of appeals erred in Merrill, in assuming
that the boundary for title must equate with the boundary for the public trust, in
assuming that the state is free to draw the public trust boundary wherever it chooses,
and in its analysis of Ohio law. Rather, as discussed in Part IV.A.1 above, the
boundary for the public trust doctrine need not be the same as the boundary between
private littoral property and the state-owned bed of Lake Erie. The starting point for
the court’s determination of the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine along
the Lake Erie shore should be the common law ordinary high water mark, because
the state received the shore in trust up to the OHWM upon statehood. From that
point, the court should have analyzed whether the Ohio General Assembly had
clearly relinquished any land from the scope of the public trust, or clearly redefined
the boundary of the public trust, in a manner consistent with the core principles of
the public trust doctrine, as discussed in Part IV.A.2 above. In my view, as
discussed below, the Ohio legislature has not done so, and the landward boundary of
the public trust doctrine along the Lake Erie shore remains the ordinary high water
mark.
Preliminarily, it should be emphasized that no Ohio Supreme Court case has
decided the boundary of the public trust along the Lake Erie shore, as the Merrill
court itself acknowledged when it described the issue before it as one of first
impression.252 The court of appeals nevertheless seemed to place considerable
weight on language from the syllabus of Sloan v. Biemiller,253 decided by the Ohio
Supreme Court in 1878, which describes the boundary for purposes of a conveyance
of land bordering Lake Erie as “the line at which the water usually stands when free
from disturbing causes.”254 As the Merrill court recognized, Sloan had borrowed this
not have been relinquished in the shores of the Great Lakes prior to Ohio statehood, even if the
original colonies had the authority to make a pre-statehood grant of title to private parties. See
Hogg v. Beerman, 41 Ohio St. 81 (1884) (holding that even if there had been an express pre1803 grant of a parcel under Lake Erie to a private party by Connecticut that was authorized
by the federal government, the grant was subject to the public’s right to navigate and fish).
248

Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶¶ 76-77, 84.

249

Id. ¶¶ 58-71, 123-29.

250

Id. ¶¶ 127-29.

251

Id. ¶ 84.

252

Id. ¶ 1.

253

Sloan v. Biemiller, 34 Ohio St. 492 (1878).

254

Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 61 (quoting Sloan, 34 Ohio St. 492, 492 (syllabus)).
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language from an Illinois Supreme Court opinion.255 But the definition of a
boundary line was not at issue in Sloan. Rather, the Sloan court held that a littoral
owner does not have the exclusive right to fish in Lake Erie waters opposite his
property. In so holding, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the beds of Lake Erie are
owned by the state, not littoral owners, and that the public has a right to fish in Lake
Erie and cannot be excluded from doing so by a littoral owner.256 The Sloan court
employed the Illinois case to support its ruling that the state, not private littoral
owners, owned the lands underlying Lake Erie, and the opinion should not be viewed
as authority for the boundary of the public trust doctrine.257
255

Sloan, 34 Ohio St. at 512-13 (quoting Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521, 524-25 (1860)); see
Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶¶ 62-65.
256

Sloan, 34 Ohio St. at 514-15.

257

As discussed in Part V.C. infra, Seaman v. Smith and its Illinois progeny speak to the
boundary for title purposes, not for the public trust, and Illinois has not specifically altered the
boundary for the public trust along Lake Michigan.
The Merrill court also relied on snippets from two other Ohio Supreme Court cases: a
sentence in the syllabus of Ohio v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677 (Ohio
1916) saying the state holds title to the “land under the waters of Lake Erie” in trust for the
public, and language in Ohio ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 710, 725
(Ohio 1948), saying that the state holds title to “the subaqueous soil of Lake Erie” in trust for
the public and that littoral owners do not have title beyond the “natural shore line” of Lake
Erie. Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶¶ 125, 126. Neither case should be viewed as guidance for
the boundary of the public trust doctrine along the Lake Erie shore. At issue in Cleveland &
Pittsburgh Railroad was whether the littoral owner was entitled to wharf out to deeper,
actually navigable water by filling in the submerged state-owned bed of Lake Erie. Cleveland
& Pittsburgh R.R., 113 N.E. at 679. Invoking Shively and Illinois Central, the Cleveland &
Pittsburgh Railroad court emphasized the importance of the public trust doctrine, but the court
held that, in the absence of legislation, the littoral owner had a right to wharf out to the harbor
line, provided he did not interfere with the public rights of navigation and fishing. Id. at 68083. In Squire, the issue was whether the government had authority to build a road on land that
had been created by the littoral owner depositing fill on the formerly submerged, state-owned
bed of Lake Erie. Squire, 82 N.E.2d at 717-19. In neither case was Ohio’s high court trying
to limit the scope of the public trust to lands that are literally under water; there was no dispute
over the boundary of the public trust in either case, because the fills indisputably had occurred
on state-owned lakebed. By reciting that the littoral owner has no title beyond the “natural
shoreline,” the Squire court was saying that the littoral owner could not acquire title to land
created artificially by fill. Id. at 730 (since littoral owner did not own filled land, case turned
on whether littoral owner had filled land for purposes of wharfing out; if so, government had
“taken” his littoral right by building a public highway on filled land).
Contrary to the court of appeals, Ohio ex rel. Duffy v. Lakefront E. Fifty-Fifth St. Corp., 27
N.E.2d 485 (Ohio 1940) was not a public trust case and was not describing where the public
trust territory commenced when it referenced “shoreline.” See Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶
68. Rather, at issue in Duffy was whether the state or the littoral owner had title to land
recently formed by accretion. Duffy, 27 N.E.2d at 485. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled in
favor of the private owner, concluding inter alia that the Fleming Act had not altered the
common law of accretion along Lake Erie. Id. at 486.
The court of appeals also pointed to 1993 Ohio Op. Att’y Gen. No. 93-025 (Oct. 27,
1993), which opined that littoral owners own above the “natural shoreline” of Lake Erie, that
the “shoreline” is the line marking the edge of a body of water, and that “the shoreline of a
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The Merrill court also looked to the Fleming Act, now codified at Ohio Revised
Code sections 1506.10 and .11.258 According to the court, the General Assembly had
via the Fleming Act in 1917 “codified” the public trust doctrine and defined “the
state’s rights in Lake Erie.”259 Focusing primarily on the statute’s use of the term
“natural shoreline,”260 the court invoked the Fleming Act to support its holding that
the water’s edge serves as the landward boundary of state ownership and the public
trust doctrine along the shore of Lake Erie.
The Fleming Act “declared that the waters of Lake Erie . . . , together with the
soil beneath and their contents, do now belong and have always, since the
organization of the state of Ohio, belonged to the state as proprietor in trust for the
people of the state . . . .”261 Pursuant to the statute, the Ohio Department of Natural
Resources may lease or permit uses of the land underlying Lake Erie by private
parties, for purposes of development or improvement, provided doing so does not
impair the public’s rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing.262
As discussed in Part IV.A.2 above, it is possible for a legislature to re-define the
boundary of the public trust doctrine, subject to restrictions imposed by the doctrine
itself. However, in my view the Fleming Act should not be interpreted as
legislatively relinquishing the public trust below the common law OHWM to the
water’s edge. First, the Fleming Act does not unambiguously evince legislative
intent to alter the boundary of the public trust doctrine along the Great Lakes shore
set by the common law. The Fleming Act was passed in the wake of Ohio v.
Cleveland & Pittsburgh Railroad, where the Ohio Supreme Court in 1916 held that
the Lake Erie waters and underlying lands were subject to the public trust doctrine,
but that the railroad had a littoral right to wharf out, provided it did not interfere with
the public’s rights to use the lake.263 Noting the absence of state legislation
regulating the littoral owner’s right to wharf out, the court ruled that the railroad
could wharf out to the harbor line established by the federal government.264 The
court invited the General Assembly to enact legislation regulating the exercise of the
body of water is in a constant state of change.” Id. at 5, 7; see Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶
72. That opinion acknowledged that no case had directly addressed the issue of a littoral
owner’s title boundary along Lake Erie, 1993 Ohio Op. Att’y Gen. No. 93-025, at 3, and it did
not purport to address the boundary of the public trust doctrine. Obviously disagreeing with
the former attorney general’s opinion, the current Ohio attorney general argued in Merrill that
the state owns up to the OHWM. Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 2.
Lastly, the Merrill court referenced regulations defining “beach,” “shore,” and
“shoreline.” OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1501-6-10 (E), (T) & (U) (2009). See Merrill, 2009 WL
2591758, ¶ 73. Those regulations were not issued pursuant to the Fleming Act and do not
indicate that the water’s edge should be the boundary for the public trust.
258

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1506.10, 1506.11 (West 2009).

259

Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 67.

260

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1506.10, 1506.11(A).

261

Id. § 1506.10.

262

Id. § 1506.11.

263

Ohio v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677 (Ohio 1916).

264

Id. at 682.
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littoral right to wharf out in Lake Erie, by articulating what littoral owners can
lawfully do without interfering with the public’s rights protected by the public trust
doctrine.265 In response, the Ohio legislature enacted the Fleming Act the following
year.266 By using the term “natural shoreline” in the Fleming Act, the legislature
seemingly merely intended to assure that formerly submerged lands that had been
artificially filled would not be excluded from public use and state control.267 The
statute was not an attempt by the General Assembly to codify all aspects of the
public trust doctrine in Ohio with respect to Lake Erie and its shores.268
Second, relinquishing the entire two hundred and sixty-two miles of Ohio shore
below the OHWM to the water’s edge would seem to violate the substantive tenets
of the public trust doctrine. Not only would the loss of such a massive amount of
shore from public trust protection constitute a substantial impairment to the public’s
rights to use Lake Erie waters and the lands underlying them, it is difficult to see
265
The court explained:
It is to be presumed that the Legislature, in the enactment of legislation on the subject,
will appropriately provide for the performance by the state of its duty as trustee for the
purposes stated; that it will determine and define what constitutes an interference with
public rights, and that it will likewise, in a spirit of justice and equity, provide for the
protection and exercise of the rights of the shore owners.
Id. at 683.
266

See Ohio ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 721 (Ohio 1948); Thomas
v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
267
Section 1506.10 of the Ohio Revised Code states:
Any artificial encroachments by public or private littoral owners, which interfere with
the free flow of commerce in navigable channels, whether in the form of wharves,
piers, fills or otherwise, beyond the natural shoreline of those waters, not expressly
authorized by the general assembly . . . shall not be considered as having prejudiced
the rights of the public in such domain.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (emphases added).

Similarly, Section 1506.11 provides: “‘Territory,’ as used in this section, means the waters
and the lands presently underlying the waters of Lake Erie and the lands formerly underlying
the waters of Lake Erie and now artificially filled, between the natural shoreline and the
international boundary line with Canada.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.11(A) (emphases
added).
The trial court in Merrill recognized that artificial filling of the lakebed would not
diminish lands subject to the public trust and expand littoral property. Merrill, 2007 WL
4910860, ¶ 250 (interpreting Ohio Revised Code § 1506.11(A) “territory” as including all
lands formerly beneath the waters of Lake Erie “notwithstanding any subsequent artificial
filling of those lands”). The court of appeals, however, indicated that the actual water’s edge
is the line between public trust lands underlying Lake Erie “and those natural or filled in lands
privately held by littoral owners.” Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 127 (emphasis added).
Allowing a littoral owner to expand her property—and diminish the public trust lands—by
depositing fill on the lakebed to create more land above the water’s edge would be contrary to
Ohio law. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1506.10, 1506.11(A); Squire, 82 N.E.2d at 730.
268

Cf. Squire, 82 N.E.2d at 725 (“It is obvious that [the Fleming Act] does not change the
concept of the declaration of the state’s title as found in the [Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R.]
case.”); Ohio ex rel. Duffy v. Lakefront E. Fifty-Fifth St. Corp., 27 N.E.2d 485, 486 (Ohio
1940) (“[N]othing in the Fleming Act . . . alters the common-law doctrine of accretion.”).
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how relinquishing such lands to private littoral owners could promote an important
public interest.269 Echoing a point made by the dissent in Glass v. Goeckel, the
Merrill court sought to help justify its holding by asserting that “[t]he water’s edge
provides a readily discernible boundary for both the public and littoral
landowners.”270 As discussed in Part V.A above regarding that Michigan case, the
state can choose to establish a brighter-line boundary, but not at the expense of the
protection of the Great Lakes shores and the public’s right to use them.
As a final point with respect to geographic scope, even if the Ohio Supreme
Court or General Assembly had adopted the water’s edge as the boundary between
the state-owned bed of Lake Erie and private littoral property for purposes of title,
the shore of Lake Erie should remain subject to the public trust up to the OHWM.
Although the state may transfer jus privatum below the OHWM to littoral owners,
the state retains the jus publicum encompassing the public’s rights to use the shore
for protected purposes.271 As set forth more fully in Part IV.2.a above, the jus
publicum can be relinquished only in limited circumstances, where the legislation is
clear, impairment of the public use is not substantial, and an important public interest
is advanced.
Although the court of appeals held that the public has no right to walk the shore
of Lake Erie on privately owned property above the water’s edge, the Merrill court
did recognize that the public has a right to walk along the shore below the water’s
edge. That is, the court recognized that walking along the shore, albeit below the
water’s edge, is a public use protected by the public trust doctrine.272 The court
specifically stated that public walking lakeward of the water’s edge does not
interfere with the rights of the littoral owner.273
The Merrill court’s finding that walking the shore of Lake Erie is a protected use
under the public trust doctrine has a strong foundation in Ohio law. Both judicially
and statutorily, Ohio has recognized that the public uses protected by the public trust
doctrine extend beyond the traditional triad. Cases hold that recreational boating is a
protected public use,274 and the Fleming Act provides that the state holds the waters

269

See Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991) (court invalidated legislation that relinquished state’s claim to riverbeds). But cf.
Opinion of Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974) (colonial ordinance granted oceanfront
landowners title to low water mark, subject only to public rights of fishing, fowling and
navigation).
270
Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 128; see Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 102-03 &
n.47 (Mich. 2005) (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
271

See Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 84 (recognizing that “the public trust in Lake Erie
cannot be abandoned . . . .”). Although paragraph 6 of the syllabus in Ohio ex rel. Squire v.
City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 710 (Ohio 1948) recites flatly that the state, as trustee with
respect to the waters of Lake Erie and underlying land, “cannot abandon the trust property,”
the opinion cites Illinois Central favorably and should not be viewed as an absolute bar to
relinquishment of land subject to the public trust doctrine. Id at 729.
272

Merrill, 2009 WL 2591758, ¶ 89.

273

Id.

274

Coleman v. Schaeffer, 126 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio 1955); Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d
1224 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
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and underlying lands of Lake Erie in trust “for the public uses to which they may be
adapted” as well as navigation, commerce, and fishing.275
In sum, despite the opinion of the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District
in Merrill, there is ample support for another Ohio court to hold that the geographic
scope of the public trust doctrine along the shore of Lake Erie extends to the
common law OHWM and that the right to walk along the shore of Lake Erie below
the OHWM is a protected use in Ohio.
C. Illinois
As early as Illinois Central, Lake Michigan and its beds were recognized as
being owned by the State of Illinois and held in trust for the benefit of the public.276
Subsequently, Illinois has statutorily reaffirmed that title to the beds of Lake
Michigan, and all other meandered lakes in Illinois, are held in trust for the people of
the state.277
Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court has continued to wield the public trust
doctrine to void legislative grants of land underlying Lake Michigan, as reflected by
People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park District.278 In 1963, the Illinois General
Assembly passed a bill, signed by the governor, conveying one hundred and ninetyfive acres of land submerged in Lake Michigan near Chicago to the U.S. Steel
Corporation, which proposed to reclaim the land and build a steel plant, in return for
a payment of $19,460 by the corporation.279 When U.S. Steel eventually tendered
payment, it was refused by the state treasurer, and the state attorney general filed suit
seeking to declare the legislation granting the land to the corporation void.
Affirming the trial court, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the legislative grant
was void because it violated the public trust doctrine. Tracing cases involving
legislative grants of submerged lands under Lake Michigan since Illinois Central, the
court found only one instance where a legislative grant of submerged land under
Lake Michigan did not violate the public trust: where the sale of a strip of shore was
upheld in order to facilitate the extension of Lake Shore Drive over the reclaimed
land, because the grant did not substantially interfere with navigation, commerce, or

275

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (West 2009); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.11(G)
(recognizing “public right of recreation”); see also Squire, 82 N.E.2d at 729-30 (teaching that
the “dead hand of the past” should not limit the protections afforded by the public trust
doctrine to “obsolete and antiquated public uses,” but instead the “law should be flexible
enough to be applied to a constantly progressive civilization”).
276

Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37 (1892).

277

615 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24 (2009). The beds of actually navigable streams and rivers in
Illinois, however, can be privately owned. Illinois follows the so-called English rule as to
ownership of beds of navigable-in-fact rivers and streams not subject to the ebb and flow of
tides. The public has an easement for purposes of navigation in waters that are navigable-infact, regardless of the ownership of the underlying soil, but the riparian owner has the
exclusive right to fish in the waters covering the soil he owns. Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783
(Ill. 1905).
278

People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1976).

279

The Chicago Park District had received an interest in the same parcel by earlier
legislation, and re-conveyed the land to the state as part of the sale. Id. at 774.
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fishing and the benefit to the private interest was incidental.280 By contrast, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the grant to U.S. Steel primarily benefitted a private
interest, would irretrievably remove one hundred and ninety-five acres of Lake
Michigan from public use, and would have an adverse effect on public use of
adjacent waters. That the legislature in the bill had articulated that the grant did not
impair the public interest and that commercially developing the submerged land
would benefit the people of Illinois was not conclusive. Likewise, claimed benefits
to the public of increased local employment and economic improvement were too
indirect, as virtually every grant of submerged lands arguably could make a similar
claim. Quoting Professor Sax, the court stated: “When a state holds a resource
which is available for the free use of the general public, a court will look with
considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to
reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the selfinterest of private parties.”281
Neither Illinois cases nor statutes expressly state that the public trust extends
geographically to the ordinary high water mark along the shores of Lake Michigan.
The Illinois Supreme Court, though, has recognized that at English common law the
crown held title to land underlying navigable waters up to the high water mark in
trust for the people, that the state became vested with such title when admitted to the
Union pursuant to the equal footing doctrine, and that the state holds such lands in
trust for the people.282
Case law indicates that, with respect to Lake Michigan, the state’s title extends to
the water line as it naturally exists free from disturbing causes.283 Although the state
may have relinquished title to some of the shore below the ordinary high water mark,
there is no indication that the state has relinquished the public trust for such shore.
Hence, the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine along the shore of Lake
Michigan in Illinois should remain the common law OHWM.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois Central expressly identified navigation,
fishing, and commerce as uses protected by the public trust doctrine in the waters
and beds of Lake Michigan.284 In addition to this traditional triad of protected uses,
the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized that the interests protected by the public
trust doctrine for Lake Michigan “extend as well to recreational uses, including
bathing, swimming and other shore activities.”285 No reported Illinois case directly
discusses the right of the public to walk along the shore of Lake Michigan. In light
of the broad recognition of recreational uses and “shore activities” as protected by
the public trust doctrine in Illinois, though, there should be no barrier to recognizing

280

People v. Kirk, 45 N.E. 830 (Ill. 1896).

281

Scott, 360 N.E.2d at 780 (quoting Sax, supra note 6, at 490).

282

Wilton v. Van Hessen, 94 N.E. 134, 136-37 (Ill. 1911) (holding that non-navigable lake
was not owned by the state).
283
Brundage v. Knox, 117 N.E. 123, 130-31 (Ill. 1917); Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521, 525
(1860).
284

Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).

285

Scott, 360 N.E.2d at 780 (quoting Neptune City v. Avon-By-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 5455 (N.J. 1972)).
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the public’s right to walk along the shore of Lake Michigan in Illinois below the
ordinary high water mark.
D. Indiana
In Indiana, the state holds Lake Michigan and its beds in trust for the public.286
Indiana owns the beds of Lake Michigan up to the “ordinary highwater mark,” which
is administratively defined as a specific elevation.287 By contrast, for other
waterways, “ordinary highwater mark” is administratively defined as the “line on the
shore of a waterway established by the fluctuations of water and indicated by
physical characteristics,” including the line impressed on the bank, shelving, changes
in the character of the soil, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, and the presence or
absence of debris.288 Various activities by shore owners require a permit below the
OHWM.289
Indiana has not expressly addressed the geographic scope of the public trust
doctrine along its Lake Michigan shore. Because the state has not, by statute or
regulation, redefined the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine, the
geographic scope of the public trust doctrine along the Lake Michigan shore may
remain the OHWM under common law, rather than the administrative definition.
Indiana also has not expressly discussed the public uses of Lake Michigan or its
shores protected by the public trust doctrine. The state, though, has defined
protected public trust uses broadly with respect to navigable inland lakes.
Specifically, a member of the public has a statutory right to walk the lakebed of a
“public freshwater lake” in Indiana. The Lakes Preservation Act expressly provides
that the state holds and controls all public freshwater lakes in trust for the use of
Indiana citizens, and that the public has the right to use freshwater lakes for
“recreational purposes,” including fishing, boating, and swimming.290 The Indiana
court of appeals, interpreting the Lakes Preservation Act, has held that any member
of the public could “walk in the shallow waters” of a public freshwater lake.291 The
Lakes Preservation Act, by its terms, does not apply to Lake Michigan.292 However,
in light of the statutory recognition of recreational uses as among those protected by
the public trust doctrine in the state, and judicial recognition of walking as being
within the scope of protected uses, there seems to be no barrier to finding that
walking along the Great Lakes shores below the OHWM would be a protected use.
286

Lake Land Co. v. State ex rel. Attorney Gen., 120 N.E. 714, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 1918)
(preventing foreign corporation from dredging sand and gravel from lakebed).
287

312 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-1-26(2) (2009) (581.5 feet IGLD 1985).

288

Id. at 1-1-26(1). Indiana does not follow the so-called English rule of title, and the
beds of navigable rivers are owned by the state. Indiana ex rel. Ind. Dep’t of Conservation v.
Kivett, 95 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Ind. 1950).
289

See 312 IND. ADMIN. CODE 6-1-1.

290

IND. CODE ANN. § 14-26-2-5 (West 2009). Indiana law appears to treat navigable
rivers differently from inland lakes. Although the state owns the beds of navigable-in-fact
rivers, the public has no right to use the shores of rivers, except in the event of emergency.
Bainbridge v. Sherlock, 29 Ind. 364, 370 (1868).
291

Parkinson v. McCue, 831 N.E.2d 118, 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

292

IND. CODE ANN. § 14-26-2-1.
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E. Minnesota
Minnesota courts repeatedly have recognized a strong public interest in navigable
waters and the lands underlying them. The state owns and holds all navigable rivers
and lakes, and their beds, in trust for “public use,”293 which has been broadly defined
by the Minnesota Supreme Court. In an early case, the court observed that public
trust uses extended beyond commercial navigation to recreational boating, “fishing,
fowling, bathing, skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and even city
purposes, cutting ice, and other public purposes which cannot now be enumerated or
even anticipated.”294 Specifically, with respect to Lake Superior, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota has recognized uses protected by the public trust include “commercial
navigation, the drawing of water for various private and public purposes, recreational
activity, and similar water-connected uses.”295 Although the public trust doctrine is
broad with respect to navigable waters and underlying lands in Minnesota, it is not
unlimited. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the state does not have the
power to take without compensation reclaimed land from Lake Superior for purposes
of constructing a public highway, because such a public use is not “connected with
navigation or any other water-connected public use.”296
The boundary between state-owned beds and privately owned uplands along
Lake Superior and navigable lakes and rivers is the ordinary low water mark. But it
is well settled that the private owner’s title is absolute only to the ordinary high water
mark. Between the low and high water marks, the private title is qualified, subject to
the rights of the public.297 Accordingly, the geographic scope of the public trust
doctrine along the shores of the Great Lakes in Minnesota extends to the ordinary
high water mark.
What constitutes the ordinary high water mark along navigable waters in
Minnesota has been described both judicially and statutorily. Courts describe it as a
water mark, coordinate with the limit of the bed of the water; the “bed” is where the
water occupies sufficiently long and continuously to wrest it from vegetation and
destroy its value for agricultural purposes. It is determined by examining the beds
and banks, and ascertaining where the presence and action of the water are so
common and usual, and so long-continued in all ordinary years, as to mark upon the
soil of a bed a character distinct from the banks, in respect to vegetation and the

293
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Longyear Holding Co., 29 N.W.2d 657, 670 (Minn. 1947);
Nelson v. DeLong, 7 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 1942); Minnesota v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 621
(Minn. 1914); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 103G.711 (West 2008) (ownership of beds and
lands under the waters of all rivers navigable for commercial purposes are owned by the state
in fee simple). Non-navigable waterways and their beds, however, are neither owned by the
state nor held in trust for the public. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893).
294

Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143 (emphasis added).

295

State v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Minn. 1971).

296

Id. at 534 (riparian had created new dry land by artificially filling the lakebed of Lake
Superior out to the point of navigability; state was not permitted to take such new dry land
without compensation to build public highway).
297

Id. at 533 (Lake Superior); Mitchell v. City of St. Paul, 31 N.W.2d 46, 49-50 (Minn.
1948); Korrer, 148 N.W. at 621-22 (dicta about Lake Superior).
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nature of the soil itself.298 The legislature has defined “ordinary high water level” as
an elevation delineating the highest water level that has been maintained for a
sufficient period of time to leave evidence upon the landscape, commonly the point
where the natural vegetation changes from predominantly aquatic to predominantly
terrestrial.299
There appears to be no reported case in Minnesota addressing the right of the
public to walk along the shore of Lake Superior between the high and low water
marks. However, because the public trust doctrine extends to the ordinary high
water mark and protects a broad range of uses, a court should be free to hold that the
public has a right to walk along the Minnesota shores of Lake Superior up to the
ordinary high water mark.
F. New York
Unquestionably, New York law recognizes the public trust in the Atlantic Ocean
and its shore up to the high water mark, and walking along the seashore between the
low and high water marks clearly is protected by the public trust. New York courts
have upheld the public’s right of passage along the seashore as incident to the
purposes of navigation, fishing, and bathing.300 Even lounging, pushing a baby
carriage, and setting up a beach umbrella on the seashore have been protected by the
public trust.301
As a general rule, the State of New York holds title to the ocean seashore below
high water mark, but the state can transfer title to private hands. Even where the jus
privatum is privately owned, the shore below high water mark remains subject to the
jus publicum interest of navigation, fishing, bathing, and other lawful purposes.302
The legislature is empowered to terminate even the jus publicum interest of small
portions of protected lands, provided the legislative grant is clear, advances the
public purpose, and does not substantially impair the public interest.303
By contrast, the public’s rights to use navigable rivers and streams in New York
are more limited. New York in part followed the so-called English common law rule
with respect to title, and the beds of various non-tidal rivers and lakes that are
navigable in fact are owned by the riparian landowners rather than the state.304 Even
so, the public retains the right of navigation on such navigable-in-fact waterways,
including the incidental privilege to walk on the bed and banks of the river, but only
when necessary to navigation, including portage onto riparian lands to circumvent
298

See Mitchell, 31 N.W.2d at 48-49.
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MINN. STAT. ANN. § 103G.005(14) (West 2008).
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Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 85 N.E. 1093, 1096 (N.Y. 1908); Arnold’s Inn,
Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
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Tucci v. Salzhauer, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972); Johnson v. May,
178 N.Y.S. 742, 742 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919).
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Arnold’s Inn, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 547.
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See People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 113 N.E. 521, 526-27 (N.Y. 1916); Saunders v.
N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 38 N.E. 992, 994 (N.Y. 1894).
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Douglastown Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E.2d 201, 204-05 (N.Y. 1997);
Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d 1192, 1194 (N.Y. 1998).
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obstacles.305 However, the public has no right to fish in navigable-in-fact rivers
where the beds are privately owned, and the owners can exclude the public from
fishing and other uses not incidental to navigation.306
New York courts, though, departed from the English rule of title with respect to
the Great Lakes, major rivers, and large inland lakes, as the beds are owned by the
state. New York has recognized that navigable waters and beds of major rivers and
lakes are held in trust by the state.307
New York courts have not directly addressed the scope of the public trust
doctrine as it relates to the shores of the Great Lakes. In Burnham v. Jones,308 the
Court of Appeals recognized that the state’s title underlying Lake Ontario extended
to the high water mark. Subsequently, however, in Stewart v. Turney,309 the Court of
Appeals held that the state’s title underlying Cayuga Lake, one of the largest Finger
Lakes, extended to the low water mark.310 A later decision by an intermediate
appellate court relied on Stewart to find that the state’s title to the beds of Lake
Ontario extended only to the low water mark, without citation to or discussion of
Burnham.311 In Stewart, the court held that persons who walked upon the shore of
Cayuga Lake above ordinary low water mark were trespassers. However, there was
no mention of the public trust doctrine, and the court seemed to equate title with the
ability to exclude the public.312
Those cases, however, preceded the enactment of a New York statute defining
“public trust lands” in a manner that supports the public’s right to walk along the
shore of the Great Lakes up to the high water mark. “Public trust lands” are defined
as:
those lands below navigable waters, with the upper boundary normally
being the mean high waterline, or otherwise determined by local custom
and practice. Public trust lands, waters, and living resources are held in
trust by the state or by the trustees of individual towns for the people to
use for walking, fishing, commerce, navigation, and other recognized uses
of public trust lands.313
In short, a robust public trust doctrine exists in New York with respect to the
ocean and its shores, specifically upholding the right of the public to walk along the
shore below the high water mark. The public trust doctrine has been applied to the
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Adirondack League, 706 N.E.2d at 1194-97.
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Douglastown Manor, 678 N.E.2d at 203-05. The Hudson and Mohawk Rivers are
exceptions. See Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y. 463 (1883).
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Saunders, 38 N.E. at 994; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 600.2(z) (2009).
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Burnham v. Jones, 20 N.E. 577, 577 (N.Y. 1889).
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Stewart v. Turney, 142 N.E. 437, 442 (N.Y. 1923).
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The Stewart opinion indicated that the line between public and private was neither
contested nor material in Burnham. Id.
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Ransom v. Shaeffer, 274 N.Y.S. 570, 573 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934).
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Great Lakes by New York courts and the legislature. Notwithstanding an apparent
split in the case law regarding whether the state’s title to lands underlying the Great
Lakes extends to the high or low water marks, there is no indication that the state has
relinquished the jus publicum interest in the Great Lakes shore below the common
law OHWM, so geographically the public trust doctrine should extend to that
OHWM. Given the longstanding rights of the public to walk the ocean shores
protected by the public trust, and the statutory recognition of walking as a protected
use, the right to walk should be a protected use along the shores of the Great Lakes
as well.
G. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania rejected the so-called English common law rule governing title to
non-tidal waters, and the commonwealth owns the beds of rivers and lakes that are
navigable in fact, not just those that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tides. The
boundary line for title purposes along navigable rivers and lakes is the low water
mark; the commonwealth holds title below the low water mark, with riparian and
littoral owners holding title above the low water mark. But between the low and
high water marks along navigable waters, the private owner’s title is not absolute.
Rather, the private owner’s rights are subject to the public’s rights of navigation,
fishing, and other public trust uses up to the high water mark.314
Pennsylvania’s appellate courts seemingly have not squarely decided the scope of
the public trust as it relates to Lake Erie. At least one trial court, though, has applied
to Lake Erie the same rules with respect to title and the public trust as followed for
navigable rivers and lakes. That is, the littoral owner’s deed was interpreted to make
the low water mark the boundary between privately owned uplands and state-owned
beds underlying Lake Erie, but the private owner’s rights up to the high water mark
were subject to the public’s rights to navigation, fishing, and other unspecified
protected uses.315 For purposes of regulating fill or encroachments upon submerged
lands along Lake Erie, the state has administratively defined both the high water
mark and the low water mark.316
Pennsylvania courts have not addressed the public’s right to walk along Lake
Erie. In general, Pennsylvania recognizes that broad uses are protected by the public
trust doctrine. The highest court has stated that public rights in navigable rivers
include, in addition to navigation and fishing, the rights to gather stones, gravel and
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Black v. Am. Int’l Corp., 107 A. 737, 738 (Pa. 1919); Freeland v. Pa. R.R. Co., 47 A.
745, 746 (Pa. 1901); Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley, 74 A. 648, 650 (Pa. 1909); Fulmer v.
Williams, 15 A. 726, 728 (Pa. 1888); Lehigh Falls Fishing Club v. Andrejewski, 735 A.2d
718, 719 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999); see also 1977 Pa. Op. Att’y Gen. No.73 (riparian’s title
between low and high water marks on navigable rivers is “qualified”).
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Sprague v. Nelson, 6 Pa. D. & C. 493, 494 (Erie C.P. 1924). The court held a member
of the public liable for trespass for removing sand and gravel from the privately owned shore,
ruling that the littoral owner had the right to make use of the sand and gravel between the low
and high water marks, and apparently concluding that removing sand and gravel from the
shore was not a protected use like navigation and fishing. Id. at 494-97.
316

The high water mark for Lake Erie is 572.8 feet IGLD, and the low water mark is 568.6
feet IGLD. 25 PA. CODE § 105.3(b) (2009).
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sand; to take ice and driftwood; and to bathe.317 Statutorily and administratively,
“recreation” is recognized as a protected public trust use.318 The Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection has published a Public Access Policy
providing that the public has a right of foot access along the Lake Erie shore in the
“public easement area” between the ordinary high and low water marks.319
In sum, Pennsylvania’s public trust doctrine extends geographically to the high
water mark along Lake Erie and protects a broad range of public uses. While
Pennsylvania courts have not squarely addressed the public’s right to walk along the
shore of Lake Erie, there seems to be no barrier to recognition of a public right to
walk the shore of Lake Erie below the high water mark in Pennsylvania.
H. Wisconsin
The Wisconsin Supreme Court repeatedly has said that the state owns the beds of
the Great Lakes up to the ordinary high water mark in trust for its people.320
Wisconsin took title to all navigable waters within the state up to the OHWM when it
was admitted to the Union, pursuant to the equal footing doctrine, including the
Great Lakes as well as lesser inland waters.321
The OHWM has been defined judicially as the point on the bank or shore where
the presence or action of the water is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark, by
erosion, vegetation, or other easily recognized characteristic. Where the bank or
shore at any particular place is of such character that it is difficult to ascertain such a
point, recourse to other places on the bank or shore of the same water body is
appropriate to determine the OHWM. This same definition of OHWM applies to
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Solliday v. Johnson, 38 Pa. 380, 381 (1861). While removing sand and gravel from the
bed of a river apparently is a protected use, removing them from the privately owned shore
between the low and high water mark apparently is not protected. See Sprague, 6 Pa. D. & C.
at 496. It should be noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a criminal case found a
defendant property owner who had erected a building and deposited fill between the high and
low water marks not guilty of obstructing navigation on a river, stating “[t]here is no highway
for travel on foot, by horse or carriage, along the shore of a navigable stream, by force merely
of the public right of navigation.” Zug v. Commonwealth, 70 Pa. 138, 141 (1871). Zug was
quoted in Sprague v. Nelson in support of that court’s finding that the public had no right to
take sand and gravel from the privately owned shore along Lake Erie. Sprague, 6 Pa. D. & C.
at 496.
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R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin, 628 N.W.2d 781, 787-88 (Wis. 2001); Wisconsin v.
Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Wis. 1987).
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Lakes Superior and Michigan, as well as to navigable rivers and other inland lakes in
Wisconsin.322
Hence, the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine in Wisconsin along the
Great Lakes shores seems clear: the state owns the shore below the OHWM along
Lakes Superior and Michigan in trust for the people. But it is far from clear what
public uses are protected by the public trust doctrine with respect to the state-owned
shore of the Great Lakes between the OHWM and the water’s edge.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1923 held that the public has no right to walk
along the state-owned shore of a navigable inland lake between the water’s edge and
the OHWM. In Doemel v. Jantz,323 the court held liable for trespass a defendant who
had walked along the shore of Lake Winnebago between the ordinary high and low
water marks. Although the shore was owned by the state in trust for the public, the
court found that the rights of the public to use the shore were limited to those
incident to navigation. “The riparian owner’s rights to the shore are exclusive as to
all the world, excepting only where those rights conflict with the rights of the public
for navigation purposes.”324 When the water is at the high water mark, the shore
beneath the water is subject to the rights of the public for navigation purposes. But
when the water recedes to the low water mark, the riparian has exclusive rights to
use the shore up to the OHWM.325
Although the rule of Doemel v. Jantz apparently has never been applied in a case
involving the Great Lakes shores, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources,
charged with enforcing the public trust doctrine, follows Doemel v. Jantz with
respect to the Great Lakes shores, too. That is, the littoral owner has the exclusive
right to use the shores of the Great Lakes below the OHWM and above the water’s
edge, subject only to the public’s right to navigate. The WDNR employs a “keep
your feet wet” policy: the public’s right to walk on the lakebed is limited to below
the water’s edge.326
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Id. at 341-43; R.W. Docks, 628 N.W.2d at 790 (Great Lakes); Diana Shooting Club v.
Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914) (navigable stream).
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Doemel v. Jantz, 193 N.W. 393, 398 (Wis. 1923).
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See WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., THE ORDINARY HIGH WATER MARK—WHAT IS IT?
(2008), http://dnr.wi.gov/org/water/wm/dsfm/shore/ohwm.htm (last visited May 27, 2010); see
also Pratt, supra note 35, at 246-47; Ricardo Pimentel, Editorial, Lake Michigan Beaches;
What Is a ‘Public Use’?, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL J., April 20, 2006, at A16.
A decade ago, the Wisconsin legislature enacted the Stream Access Law, which
authorized members of the public to use any exposed shore area of a stream between the
OHWM and the water’s edge, without the permission of the riparian, to engage in waterrelated recreational activity. 1999 Wis. Act 9, § 793t (repealed 2001). While popular with
anglers, canoeists, and kayakers, the statute ignited a firestorm of protest among riparian
owners. Two years later, the statute was amended to eliminate the statutory right of the public
to use the shore of streams and to revert to prior traditional law—the public can use the
exposed shore area between the OHWM and the water’s edge without permission of the
riparian only if necessary to bypass an obstruction. 2001 Wis. Act 16, § 1255d-1255v
(codified as amended at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 30.134 (West 2009)) (effective Sept. 1, 2001).
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In my view, following the Doemel v. Jantz rule with respect to the Great Lakes
shores in Wisconsin is at odds with the state supreme court’s more recent
pronouncements regarding the public trust doctrine and the Great Lakes. In R.W.
Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin,327 the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 2001 acknowledged
that the uses protected by the public trust in Wisconsin originally focused on
commercial navigation, but public trust uses have been expanded to include purely
recreational purposes such as boating, swimming, fishing, hunting, and preserving
scenic beauty.328 Since protected public trust uses in Wisconsin are no longer
directly tied to navigation, the logic of Doemel v. Jantz no longer holds true. A
Wisconsin court should be free to hold that the public has the right to use the shore
of the Great Lakes below OHWM for the full panoply of public trust uses, including
walking.
VI. CONCLUSION
The shores of the Great Lakes need not be a battleground. This Article proposes
a uniform analytical framework for use by each Great Lakes state in determining the
public’s right to use the Great Lakes shores. Flexible enough to allow each state to
strike its own balance between the public interest and those of private landowners,
the proposed framework provides a predictable approach to questions regarding use
of the Great Lakes shores, grounded in the core principles of the public trust
doctrine.
The proposed framework employs a two-prong approach. First, it determines the
geographic scope of the public trust doctrine applicable to the shores of the Great
Lakes. The starting point is the lands the states acquired in trust when they became
states, which the Article concludes is the lands underlying the Great Lakes up to the
ordinary high water mark, a conclusion informed in large measure by the equal
footing doctrine. While the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine can be
changed in each state, the ability to effect change is circumscribed by the principles
of the public trust doctrine itself. Second, the framework determines the types of
uses protected by the public trust doctrine along the shores of the Great Lakes.
These protected uses should include both traditional uses of navigation, fishing, and
commerce, and additional uses of the shore that are important to the public today, but
which do not unreasonably interfere with the rights of littoral owners.
The proposed framework is consistent with the laws of each Great Lakes state, as
well as the core principles of the public trust doctrine, and its adoption would bring a
consistent, well-founded approach to deciding disputes regarding use of the Great
Lakes shores, including whether and where the public has a right to walk.
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Id. at 787-88. The court held that denial of a permit to dredge the state-owned bed of
Lake Superior was not a regulatory taking of riparian rights, which were subordinate to the
public trust doctrine. Id. at 791. The R.W. Docks court also grounded the public trust doctrine
in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and Wisconsin Constitution article IX, § 1. Id. at 787.
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